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Introduction
As Professor Kelso's admirable study recognizes, any considera-
tion of the appellate system in California must take account of the
California Supreme Court's unique and controversial practice of
"depublishing" selected opinions of the courts of appeal.1 The court
began depublishing cases in 19712 and now, as Professor Kelso notes,
depublishes more cases than it publishes. 3 In the most recent year the
court decided 95 cases by written opinion and depublished 109 court
of appeal opinions.4 Depublication thus stands today as a major way
1. J. Clark Kelso, A Report on the California Appellate System, 45 HASTINGS L.J.
433, 492-96 (1994). The practice is also called, more euphemistically, "decertification," a
term based on the court of appeal's having initially "certified" the opinion for publication.
See CAL. CT. R. 976(c)(1). But "depublication" has always been the more common usage,
as well as the more descriptive one. And the new rule of court governing the practice,
Rule 979, is titled "Requesting Depublication of Published Opinions" and uses that term
exclusively. See CAL. CT. R. 979; infra note 99. No other court in this country, or else-
where, appears to have such a practice. See Stephen R. Barnett, Making Decisions Disap-
pear: Depublication and Stipulated Reversal in the California Supreme Court, 26 Loy. L.A.
L. REV. 1033, 1034-57 (1993).
2. See Julie H. Biggs, Note, Decertification of Appellate Opinions: The Need for Ar-
ticulated Judicial Reasoning and Certain Precedent in California Law. 50 S. CAL. L. REV.
1181, 1200 (1977).
3. Kelso, supra note 1, at 496.
4. See Gerald F. Uelmen, Mainstream Justice, CAL. LAW., July 1989, at 36, 40. You
couldn't tell that from reading the Annual Report of the Judicial Council of California.
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in which the California Supreme Court shapes-or tries to shape-
California's law. Whether this singular procedure s can hold that role
indefinitely, or is more likely to unravel from its own internal contra-
dictions, is the subject of this Comment.
The supreme court accomplishes depublication by using its power
under California Rule of Court 976(c)(2) to order that a court of ap-
peal opinion, certified by the court of appeal for publication in the
official California Appellate Reports under Rule 976,6 "not be pub-
lished" there after all.7 The opinion thus is rendered "unpublished"
and brought under California Rule of Court 977(a), which states that,
with narrow exceptions, an unpublished opinion "shall not be cited or
relied on by a court or a party in any other action or proceeding."8
The supreme court orders an opinion depublished without hearing the
case or giving reasons for its action, but also without affecting the re-
sult; despite depublication of the opinion, the decision of the court of
appeal stands.
Depublication is controversial, and Professor Kelso joins the bri-
gade of critics with his declaration that the practice "should be
stopped."9 As the debate continues,' 0 however, the meaning and im-
That Report, in its "Judicial Statistics" on the work of the California Supreme Court, con-
tinues to ignore depublication. See II JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1993 ANNUAL
REPORT 3-14 (1994); infra note 171.
5. The quaint California custom of depublication caught the eye of the national press
in October 1993 when the judge at the trial of two men accused of beating Reginald Denny
at the start of the 1992 Los Angeles riots dismissed a juror for "failing to deliberate." It
turned out that there was a 1991 court of appeal decision upholding similar action by a trial
judge, but the decision had been depublished. People v. DeJurnett, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1065,
282 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1991), ordered depublished, California Supreme Court Minutes, Sept.
19, 1991, in CAL. OFFICIAL REP. (advance sheet), Oct. 19, 1991, at 15. The Wall Street
Journal wondered at this "quirk of California law." Benjamin A. Holden, Another Juror
Dismissed in Denny Trial, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 1993, at B5; see also Seth Mydans, Judge
Voids Verdicts and Drops 2d Juror in Riot Assault Trial, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 13, 1993, at Al
(stating that decision was "left in legal limbo").
6. CAL. Cr. R. 976(b), (c)(1). Rule 976(b) declares that a court of appeal opinion
may not be published in the Official Reports unless the opinion: establishes a new rule of
law or modifies an existing rule; resolves or creates a conflict; involves a noteworthy legal
issue; or makes a significant contribution to legal literature. Rule 976(c)(1) provides that a
court of appeal opinion shall be published if a majority of the court rendering the opinion
certifies that it meets one or more of those standards.
7. CAL. CT. R. 976(c)(2) ("An opinion certified for publication shall not be pub-
lished, and an opinion not so certified shall be published, on an order of the Supreme
Court to that effect.").
8. CAL. CT. R. 977(a). The exceptions apply when the opinion is relevant under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel, or when it has collateral
relevance in a criminal or disciplinary proceeding. CAL. CT. R. 977(b).
9. Kelso, supra note 1, at 496; see, e.g., Barnett, supra note 1, at 1034-57; Robert S.
Gerstein, "Law by Elimination". Depublication in the California Supreme Court, 67 JUDI-
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pact of depublication are changing. As a result of actions by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court and of depublication's own dynamic and
internal contradictions, the procedure appears to be gradually losing
its law-making force.
Four developments contribute to this process of erosion. First is a
slippage, wrought by supreme court decisions, in the traditionally un-
derstood meaning of depublication, as the court increasingly agrees
with opinions it has depublished and rejects opposing ones it has left
standing.11 Second is California Rule of Court 979(e), adopted by the
supreme court in 1990. This rule declares that an order of the
supreme court depublishing a court of appeal opinion "shall not be
deemed an expression of opinion of the Supreme Court of the correct-
ness of the result reached by the decision or of any of the law set forth
in the opinion."'12 Third is the 1993 decision of the California
Supreme Court in People v. Saunders,13 where the court for the first
time interpreted Rule 979(e) and ruled on the meaning of depublica-
tion.14 Fourth is the spreading subversion of Rule 977(a)'s mandate
that a depublished opinion may not be "cited" or "relied on," a pro-
cess fueled by the advent of computerized legal research and led by
the supreme court's own example in citing depublished opinions (and,
at least in one instance, relying on them as well). 15 Taken together,
these developments contradict the traditional understanding of
depublication and undermine the court's apparent purpose in adopt-
ing the procedure.
This Comment discusses first the changed meaning of depublica-
tion, as reflected in a series of supreme court decisions, including
Saunders, and in Rule 979(e). It then examines the undoing of the
rule against "citing" or "relying on" depublished opinions. Finally it
appraises the remaining force of depublication in the wake of these
events.
CATURE 293 (1984); Gerald F. Uelmen, Publication and Depublication of California Court
of Appeal Opinions: Is the Eraser Mightier than the Pencil?, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1007
(1993).
10. See, e.g., Philip Hager, Supreme Justices Step Cautiously, Unanimously, Toward
Era of Reforms, S.F. DAILY J., Jan. 27, 1994, at 1, 8; Jean Guccione & Philip Hager, Sum-
mary Dispositions Are Seen as Improvements, S.F. DAILY J., Jan. 27, 1994, at 8.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 26-44, 109-152.
12. CAL. CT. R. 979(e).
13. 5 Cal. 4th 580, 853 P.2d 1093, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 638 (1993).
14. Id. at 592 n.8, 853 P.2d at 1098-99 n.8, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 643-44 n.8.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 181-205.
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I. The Changed Meaning of Depublication: From What
Everyone Knows to What No One May Say
A. The Traditional Understanding
For the first nineteen years of depublication, until 1990, the pur-
pose and meaning of a supreme court order depublishing a court of
appeal opinion commanded a certain consensus. This "traditional un-
derstanding" rested on what seemed obvious inferences from what the
court was doing and on statements by individual justices outside of
court. (The court itself before 1990 had issued no opinion, no rule,
nor any other statement on the subject.) It was thought to be clear-
as it still is-that the supreme court in depublishing an opinion was
not disagreeing, except in the rarest case, with the court of appeal's
judgment that the opinion was important enough for publication
under Rule 976.16 Rather, as stated in 1976 by former Chief Justice
Donald R. Wright-the presumptive father of depublication, since he
was chief justice when the practice began-the court normally depub-
lished opinions that it thought were correct in result but that con-
tained "language which is an erroneous statement of the law and if left
on the books would not only disturb the pattern of the law but would
be likely to mislead judges, attorneys and other interested
individuals. '17
Two other justices have spoken on depublication. Wright's suc-
cessor, Chief Justice Rose Elizabeth Bird, speaking in 1978, described
depublished opinions as "erroneous rulings" and ones "with which the
court does not agree.' 8 Justice Joseph R. Grodin, writing in 1984,
16. See Joseph R. Grodin, The Depublication Practice of the California Supreme
Court, 72 CAL. L. REv. 514, 514 (1984).
17. Biggs, supra note 2, at 1185 n.20 (quoting letter dated Nov. 9, 1976, from retired
Chief Justice Donald R. Wright).
18. Chief Justice Rose Elizabeth Bird, Remarks Before the Conference of Delegates
at the State Bar Convention in San Francisco, California, on Sept. 10, 1978, in Report, L.A.
DAILY J., Oct. 6, 1978, at 8 (copy on file with the Hastings Law Journal). Chief Justice Bird
observed that while the supreme court cannot control the number of petitions for review
filed, it can control the number granted. Id. She continued:
And yet, if the Supreme Court is confronted with a petition where the reviewing
court has erred, it must take steps to ensure that the Court of Appeal opinion
does not create confusion in the decisional law.
In an effort to deal with this situation quickly and still fulfill its oversight
function, the Supreme Court has come to rely increasingly on the nonpublication
rule to decertify a published opinion with which the court does not agree in lieu
of accepting the case for hearing.
Id. Chief Justice Bird went on to express misgivings about depublication-averring, for
example, that "[r]eliance on this technique ironically may result in neither of the two func-
tions of the appellate process, justice and predictability, being fulfilled"-and called it "a
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gave the most detailed exposition from within the court. He wrote
that the court, in the "vast majority" of cases, ordered depublication
"because a majority of the justices consider the opinion to be wrong in
some significant way, such that it would mislead the bench and bar if it
remained as citable precedent." 19 Justice Grodin further noted that
depublication avoided leaving lawyers and lower courts with "a pub-
lished decision, citable as precedent and binding upon the trial courts,
that stands for what the [supreme] court considers the law is not."20
Depublication thus had the purpose, in Justice Grodin's apparent
view, of "providing guidance for the development of the law."21
These three pronouncements from within the court reflected con-
sistently the understanding that the court depublished an opinion be-
cause, in Justice Grodin's words, it found the opinion "wrong in some
significant way." This understanding rested also on what was per-
ceived to be common sense. As Professor Kelso puts it, "The only
sensible rationale for taking the time to depublish is because some-
thing was wrong with the opinion. '22 Thus Professor Gerstein could
write in 1984, memorializing the traditional understanding, that "eve-
ryone is aware" that a depublication order means "a rejection by the
supreme court of some significant aspect" of the court of appeal
opinion.2 3
B. The Latent Flaw in the Traditional Understanding
Solid as the consensus was, one can see now that the traditional
understanding harbored a latent flaw. The nature and procedure of
depublication would undermine, sooner or later, attribution to the
court's action of any consistent meaning, even so broad and vague a
meaning as calling the depublished opinion "wrong in some significant
way." When the supreme court depublishes an opinion, the justices
give no reason for their action. Nor do they need to agree among
themselves on a reason. Further, depublication has no effect on the
weak instrument by which to ensure that precedent is followed by the appellate courts of
this state." Id.
19. Grodin, supra note 16, at 514-15. Depublication is "most frequently used," Justice
Grodin added, "when the court considers the result to be correct" but disagrees with some
of the reasoning, though "[t]here are times" when the court "considers the result to be
wrong as well." Id. at 522.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Kelso, supra note 1, at 495 n.221.
23. Gerstein, supra note 9, at 297; see also Jerome B. Falk, Jr., Summary Disposition:
An Alternative to Supreme Court Depublication, 5 CAL. LITIG. 35, 38 (1992) (referring to "a
judgment ... discredited by depublication").
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result of a case, imposes no burden of work on the court, and suppos-
edly leaves nothing standing as a citable precedent. Depublication
thus must seem an almost costless action for the court. Its attraction
must be particularly strong because of the speed with which the court
must act on each of more than 150 items at its weekly conference.24
Under this time pressure, when a petition for review presents close
questions or difficult issues or splinters the court, or when a court of
appeal opinion departs from received judicial wisdom or is otherwise
provocative or iconoclastic,25 or when anything else about a decision
or opinion makes four justices uncomfortable, depublication must
seem the quick and easy way to get rid of the problem. On a quick
appraisal of risks and benefits-without the time to consider carefully
the benefits of letting the opinion stand-depublication must often
seem the safe, conservative, risk-averse thing to do. The court's rule
of thumb may be, "When in doubt, depublish."
But the coin has another side. Just as depublication is attractive
because it requires no agreement on reasons and perhaps no close
consideration of the case against depublication, so decisions to depub-
lish cannot be expected to reflect continually a common rationale.
The label "wrong in some significant way" will not attach indefinitely
to all the cases. Sooner or later, when the court ultimately grants re-
view to decide an issue that has split the courts of appeal, and finally
gives full consideration to both sides of the issue, it will find that it
agrees with cases it has depublished and disagrees with opposing ones
it has left on the books. When that happens the traditional under-
standing begins to unravel, and with it the supposed "guidance for the
development of the law." In a series of supreme court cases beginning
in 1986, that is what has been happening.
C. In re Huffinan: The First Crack
The first major crack in the traditional understanding, a fissure
that proved subversive in more ways than one, appeared in 1986 in an
obscure criminal case, In re Huffinan.26 The issue was whether a de-
fendant who had been convicted of a crime and then confined for
treatment as a mentally disordered sex offender (MDSO) was consti-
24. See Bird, supra note 18; Grodin, supra note 16, at 524 (rejecting a proposal that
the court give reasons for its decisions to depublish on the ground, in part, that since the
court passes on some 150 items at its weekly conference, "to reach consensus upon a state-
ment of reasons for depublication would be a heroic feat in such a short time").
25. See Gerald F. Uelmen, Waiting for Thunderclaps, CAL. LAw., June 1993, at 29.
26. 42 Cal. 3d 552, 724 P.2d 475, 229 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1986).
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tutionally entitled to "conduct" credits against a subsequent prison
term for time spent in the treatment facility.27 In 1984 a court of ap-
peal had held in People v. Jobinger28 that MDSOs were entitled to the
credits.29 There had ensued two lines of court of appeal opinions, one
following Jobinger, one rejecting it. Thus in People v. Cruz,30 in 1985,
the court of appeal pointed out that "[t]here are now two cases," Job-
inger and People v. Richard,31 holding that MDSOs were entitled to
the credits.32 "We use the word 'now,"' the Cruz court continued, "be-
cause there have been other cases since decertified by the California
Supreme Court that held otherwise. '33 The court thereupon identi-
fied 34-by name, "Cal. App." designation, and date of depublica-
tion-three such cases.35 Justice Wiener continued:
Prompted by the disappearance of only those cases explaining why
Jobinger was wrong, we believe little will be gained by our contrib-
uting to the legal literature on this subject. Nudged toward firmer
respect for the doctrine of stare decisis by the California Supreme
Court's selective depublication process, we merely cite Jobinger and
Richard and give Cruz the conduct credits for the time he spent at
Patton State Hospital.36
Justice Lewis dissented, finding it "difficult to accept the majority's
view there is stare decisis effect to be given to the depublication or-
ders. '37 The People petitioned for review, but the supreme court de-
nied it.38 The court subsequently granted review in Huffman,
however, to decide the issue.39
27. Id. at 553-54, 724 P.2d at 475, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 789.
28. 153 Cal. App. 3d 689, 200 Cal. Rptr. 546 (1984).
29. Id. at 691, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 548.
30. 165 Cal. App. 3d 648, 211 Cal. Rptr. 512 (1985).
31. 161 Cal. App. 3d 559, 207 Cal. Rptr. 715 (1984).
32. Cruz, 165 Cal. App. 3d at 652, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
33. Id., 211 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
34. I say "identified" to avoid a conclusory use of the word "cited." A major question
in this Comment will be whether references similar to these constitute "citing" a case
within the meaning of Rule 977(a). See infra text accompanying notes 169-178. My avoid-
ance of the word should not be taken to imply that the court was not "citing" these cases.
35. Cruz, 165 Cal. App. 3d at 652, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 514. The cases were identified in
the official California Appellate Reports as follows: "In re Van Renselaar (Cal. App.) (or-
dered depublished Oct. 19, 1984); People v. Lovedy (Cal. App.) (ordered depublished Jan
3, 1985); and People v. Abril (Cal. App.) (ordered depublished Feb. 14, 1985)." Cruz, 165
Cal. App. 3d at 652. The unofficial California Reporter added full Cal. App. and Cal. Rptr.
citations for each case. Cruz, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
36. Cruz, 165 Cal. App. 3d at 652, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
37. Id. at 655, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 516 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
38. California Supreme Court Minutes, May 16, 1985, in CAL. OFFICIAL REP. (ad-
vance sheet), June 20, 1985, at 32.
39. California Supreme Court Minutes, July 11, 1985, in CAL. OFFICIAL REP. (ad-
vance sheet), Aug. 13, 1985, at 9.
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The supreme court decided in Huffman, unanimously, that the
MDSOs were not entitled to the credits.4 In reaching this conclusion
the court discussed, and rejected, the reasoning of the court of appeal
in Jobinger.41 In a footnote, the court acknowledged that "[t]wo sub-
sequent Court of Appeal cases have followed Jobinger"-citing Cruz
and Richard-and that "[w]e ordered that several Court of Appeal
decisions which disagreed with Jobinger not be published."42 Unlike
the court of appeal in Cruz, the supreme court did not identify those
decisions, even by name.
Huffman's significance in the history of depublication is twofold.
First, Huffman may have been the first case in which the supreme
court, faced with two conflicting lines of court of appeal decisions, one
published and one depublished, agreed with the depublished ones. At
least Huffinan appears to be the first case in which the court did this
explicitly, with a reference to the depublished status of the vindicated
opinions. Huffinan thus represents the supreme court's first clear con-
futation of the traditional understanding of depublication.
Huffman's second significance was more fortuitous but, in the
end, more conclusive. The lawyers for the successful MDSO in the
court of appeal in Cruz were associated with Appellate Defenders,
Inc., of San Diego.43 An attorney from that office, partly as a result of
his experience with Cruz and with what happened to Cruz in
Huffnan, was prompted to draft the language that became Rule
979(e) of the California Rules of Court, stating that a depublication
order "shall not be deemed an expression of opinion of the Supreme
Court .... " The court's rejection of the traditional understanding in
Huffman thus was cast into stone as a Rule of Court. But that tale lies
slightly ahead.44
D. People v. Turner: Subversion by Toenote
The next marker in the changing course of depublication was a
decision of the California Supreme Court in April 1990, People v. Tur-
ner.45 Turner was a death penalty appeal in which the defendant's
appellate counsel, in arguing that the trial court had improperly ad-
40. 42 Cal. 3d at 554, 724 P.2d at 475, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 789.
41. Id. at 559-61, 724 P.2d at 480, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 793-94.
42. Id. at 560 n.6, 724 P.2d at 480 n.6, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 794 n.6.
43. Telephone Interview with Howard C. Cohen, Esq., Appellate Defenders, Inc., San
Diego (Jan. 11, 1994).
44. See infra text accompanying notes 89-100.
45. 50 Cal. 3d 668,789 P.2d 887,268 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1053
(1991).
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mitted his client's prior felony convictions for the purpose of impeach-
ment, faced the problem that trial counsel had not objected to their
admission. 46 Turner's trial, in November 1984, was governed by Prop-
osition 8, adopted in 1982, which amended the state constitution to
provide that "any" prior felony conviction could be used "without lim-
itation" for purposes of impeachment. 47 After Turner's trial the
supreme court had decided People v. Castro,48 which held that Propo-
sition 8 did not eliminate the trial court's discretion to exclude prior
felonies offered for impeachment.
In order to reach the issue whether admitting the priors was error
under Castro, Turner's appellate counsel made two arguments to sur-
mount trial counsel's failure to object. First, appellate counsel argued
that such an objection would have appeared futile under a string of
court of appeal cases on Proposition 8 decided prior to the trial.49
Second, appellate counsel argued in the alternative that trial counsel
had been incompetent in not objecting to admission of the priors on
the basis of the possibility that the question ultimately would be de-
cided in favor of their excludability.50 The problem with the first ar-
gument was that the court of appeal cases which assertedly would
have made an objection appear futile had all been depublished by the
time of the trial, as had the one court of appeal case going the other
way.51 Appellate counsel dealt with this problem by avoiding citation
of the court of appeal cases but letting the supreme court know, in
Aesopian language, both that they existed and that they had been
depublished. 52
The supreme court accepted the first argument. "[W]e need not
brand counsel incompetent in order to address the merits of defend-
ant's claim on direct appeal," the court said, because this was a case
where "the pertinent law later changed so unforeseeably that it [was]
46. See id. at 703, 789 P.2d at 905, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
47. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(f); see Turner, 50 Cal. 3d at 703, 789 P.2d at 905, 268 Cal.
Rptr. at 724.
48. 38 Cal. 3d 301, 696 P.2d 111, 211 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1985).
49. Appellant's Opening Brief at 88-90 & n.10, Turner, 50 Cal. 3d at 668, 789 P.2d at
905, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 724 (No. S004658).
50. Id. at 90-93.
51. See Turner, 50 Cal. 3d at 704 n.17, 789 P.2d at 906 n.17, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 725 n.17.
52. The brief stated that "every Court of Appeal that had addressed the problem" at
the time of the trial had resolved it against any restrictions on the admissibility of impeach-
ment priors. Appellant's Opening Brief at 89, Turner (No. S004658). Without citing those
decisions, counsel appended a footnote stating, in a tour de force of indirection: "The
foregoing statement regarding Court of Appeal decisions is based upon appellate counsel's
study of the Cumulative Subsequent History Table in the Bancroft-Whitney Official Re-
ports advance sheets." Id. at 89 n.10.
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unreasonable to expect trial counsel to have anticipated the
change. '53 At the time of the trial it was "widely assumed" that Prop-
osition 8 removed all restrictions on admitting prior felony convictions
for purposes of impeachment, and "all but one originally published
Court of Appeal decision addressing the issue had so concluded," the
court said.54 Turner's trial counsel "cannot be saddled with the bur-
den of anticipating such an abrupt change in the law," the court con-
cluded.55 (Addressing thus the Castro claim, the court held that any
error in admitting the priors was harmless on the facts of Turner.)56
The crucial words in the court's opinion, for present purposes, are
the "all but one originally published" court of appeal decisions.
"[O]riginally published" means that the decisions had been depub-
lished (and that this had happened before the trial).5 7 The use of
these depublished cases then became the subject of two remarkable
footnotes to the Turner opinion.
(1) Thrner's Footnote Seventeen
Footnote Seventeen is attached to the statement in the text that
"all but one originally published Court of Appeal decision had so con-
cluded.158 Footnote Seventeen is a strange, split-level affair that fea-
tures a footnote to a footnote, or perhaps a toenote.5 9 On the
footnote's top level, the court-less inhibited than Turner's appellate
counsel-identifies the "originally published" court of appeal deci-
sions. Seven such cases are listed, the first six introduced by "See"
and the seventh by "but see."' 60 Each case is identified by name and a
parenthetical "Cal. App."' 61 designation. For example, the first case is
given as: "People v. Rangel (Cal. App.)." 62
53. Turner, 50 Cal. 3d at 703, 789 P.2d at 905, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
54. Id. at 703-04, 789 P.2d at 905-06, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
55. Id. at 704, 789 P.2d at 906, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
56. Id at 705, 789 P.2d at 907, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 726. The court's acceptance of coun-
sel's argument presumably meant, however, that other defendants convicted at pre-Castro
trials could raise Castro claims on appeal despite their trial counsel's failure to object to
admission of the priors.
57. See id. at 704 n.17, 789 P.2d at 906 n.17, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 725 n.17.
58. Id. at 704, 789 P.2d at 906, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
59. Readers of academic literature may cringe at the thought of academic writers get-
ting hold of this technique for doubling their footnote capability.
60. Id. at 704 n.17, 789 P.2d at 906 n.17, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 725 n.17.
61. "Cal. App." is the usual way of citing California's official appellate reporter, the
California Appellate Reports.
62. Id. at 704 n.17, 789 P.2d at 906 n.17, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 725 n.17.
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This string of case references then itself sports a footnote, indi-
cated by an asterisk, and under a leaded line appears the toenote, la-
beled "Reporter's Note." Presumably the voice of the court's
Reporter of Decisions, this note gives for each of the seven cases a
more detailed identification, including the docket number in the court
of appeal and the date of depublication by the supreme court. The
first case thus becomes: "People v. Rangel (4 Crim. 14993), opinion
deleted upon direction of Supreme Court by order dated June 14,
1984."'63 In one instance the "Reporter's Note" gives volume and
page citations to the official California Appellate Reports and the un-
official California Reporter, but only for a subsequent court of appeal
opinion in the same case.64 Neither tier of the footnote gives a "Cal.
App." or "Cal. Rptr.' '65 citation for any of the "originally published"
opinions.
Footnote Seventeen of Turner is significant primarily as a ground-
breaking step in erosion of the rule against "citing" depublished opin-
ions. This is a theme taken up later.66 It may be noted here, however,
that in identifying the depublished cases by name, docket number, and
date of depublication, the court-or its alter ego, the Reporter of De-
cisions-was "citing" them by some definitions of that term, though
not by a narrow definition requiring a volume-and-page reference (or
other numerical designation) to the California Appellate Reports, the
California Reporter, or some other legal reporter. Subject to one's
definition of "citing" a case, 67 then, Footnote Seventeen in Turner
may be recorded as the first time the California Supreme Court
"cited" depublished opinions, California Rule of Court 977(a)
notwithstanding. 68
(2) Turner's Footnote Eighteen
Footnote Eighteen of the Turner opinion, a more traditional one-
story structure, is attached to the text's statement that the defendant's
trial counsel "cannot be saddled" with the burden of anticipating Cas-
63. Id. at 704 n.17, 789 P.2d at 906 n.17, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 725 n.17.
64. Id. at 704 n.17, 789 P.2d at 906 n.17, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 725 n.17.
65. "Cal. Rptr." is the usual way of citing California's unofficial appellate reporter,
the California Reporter.
66. See infra text accompanying notes 184-195.
67. See infra text accompanying notes 184-195.
68. But see Lindeleaf v. Agricultural Lab. Rel. Bd., 41 Cal. 3d 861, 870, 718 P.2d 106,
111, 226 Cal. Rptr. 119, 124 (1986) (referring to depublished opinion by name and docket
number and holding that, having been depublished, opinion could not have been relied on
as justifying failure to exhaust remedies).
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tro.69 In this footnote the court replies to the People's argument that
Castro was not so unforeseeable as to excuse counsel's failure to ob-
ject. Such objections obviously had been made, the People pointed
out, in the several pre-Castro cases that produced appellate opinions
on the question. The court replied that "[t]hese challenges had con-
sistently been rebuffed," and that counsel need not have anticipated
that the court would later reject "'the apparently prevalent contempo-
raneous interpretation."' 70 Footnote Eighteen continues:
For similar reasons, it is not dispositive that, at the time of de-
fendant's guilt trial, we had caused depublication of every published
opinion addressing the "prior impeachment" language of Proposi-
tion 8, regardless of result, and had granted hearing in Castro and
several other such cases. We have long cautioned that such actions
on our part have no precedential value and may not be construed as
a signal of our ultimate intentions. 7'
Footnote Eighteen is significant in two ways. First, together with
the text of the Turner opinion, Footnote Eighteen suggests that
whether or not the court was "citing" depublished opinions, it was
"relying on" them, in violation of Rule 977(a)'s other prohibition.2
To be sure, the court was not relying on the pre-Castro decisions for
the purpose of establishing the present, post-Castro state of the law.
It would have been relying on them, rather, to establish the state of
the law as it would have appeared to competent counsel at the time of
Turner's trial. That may still be reliance. When the court concludes
that trial counsel's conduct was justified because "all but one origi-
nally published Court of Appeal decision addressing the issue had so
concluded, '73 it is hard to see how the court is not "relying" on those
originally published decisions. When the court says in Footnote
Eighteen that the challenges to admission of impeachment priors in
pre-Castro appellate opinions "had consistently been rebuffed, '74 it is
hard to see how the court is not "relying" on the opinions that did the
rebuffing.7 5 I will have more to say about this point later.76
The second point about Footnote Eighteen goes more directly to
the meaning of depublication. The pertinent passage is the court's
*69. Turner, 50 Cal. 3d at 704, 798 P.2d at 906-07, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
70. Id. at 704-05 n.18, 789 P.2d at 906 n.18, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 725 n.18.
71. Id at 704-05 n.18, 789 P.2d at 906 n.18, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 725 n.18.
72. See supra text accompanying note 8; infra text accompanying notes 184-195.
73. Turner, 50 Cal. 3d at 703-04, 798 P.2d at 906, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
74. Id. at 704-05 n.18, 789 P.2d at 906 n.18, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 725 n.18.
75. See Lindeleaf, 41 Cal. 3d at 870,718 P.2d at 111, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 124; supra note
68.
76. See infra text accompanying notes 191-193.
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statement, concerning its depublication of every published opinion ad-
dressing the "prior impeachment" language of Proposition 8 and its
grants of hearing in Castro and other cases: "We have long cautioned
that such actions on our part have no precedential value and may not
be construed as a signal of our ultimate intentions. '77
It is not clear what the court means by "such actions on our
part"-whether it is referring to depublications, to grants of hearing,
or to both. Although the court cites no authority for its statement, it
had indeed "long cautioned" that grants of hearing had no preceden-
tial value and should not be considered a signal of its ultimate inten-
tions.78 With regard to depublications, however, it does not appear
that the court had previously so "cautioned." The Wright-Bird-
Grodin line of out-of-court declarations pointed, in fact, in the oppo-
site direction. 79 This statement in Footnote Eighteen thus may be
considered a harbinger of the revisionist Rule 979(e), adopted two
months later.80 Turner's holding, moreover, reinforced the footnote's
statement. The court clearly was according "no precedential value" to
the depublication orders issued prior to Turner's trial when it held that
trial counsel had been justified in relying on the depublished opinions,
their depublication notwithstanding.8'
The facts of Turner, however, may drain from the footnote's
statement any such meaning. Since the court at the time of Turner's
trial had depublished cases going both ways on the "prior impeach-
ment" issue,82 of course its actions could have "no precedential value"
and could give no "signal of [its] ultimate intentions." Turner proba-
bly says nothing about the meaning of depublication in the more com-
mon and critical situation where the court has depublished cases going
one way and left opposing cases on the books.
E. California Rule of Court 979(e)
(1) The Rule
The next event that shaped the meaning of depublication, and
may well have transformed it, came on July 1, 1990, when the supreme
77. Turner, 50 Cal. 3d at 704-05 n.18, 789 P.2d at 906 n.18, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 725 n.18.
78. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 147 Cal. 346, 350, 81 P. 718, 720 (1905) (refusal to trans-
fer case not to be regarded as an expression of opinion by the court); People v. Triggs, 8
Cal. 3d 884, 890-91, 506 P.2d 232, 236, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408, 412 (1973) (refusal to grant
hearing not to be regarded as an expression of opinion by the court).
79. See supra text accompanying notes 17-21.
80. See infra text accompanying notes 83-117.
81. Turner, 50 Cal. 3d at 703-04 n.18, 789 P.2d at 906 n.18, 268 Cal. Rptr at 725 n.18.
82. See id. at 703-04 n.18, 789 P.2d at 906 n.18, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 725 n.18.
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court adopted California Rule of Court 979, the first rule governing
(or mentioning) depublication.8 3 Until then, although the court was
depublishing more cases than it was deciding by opinion,84 it had no
rule stating who could apply to have an opinion depublished, or how
or when to apply, or even acknowledging the procedure's existence.
Rule 979, titled "Requesting Depublication of Published Opinions,"
does acknowledge depublication-bravely calling it that8 -5-and lays
out procedures for asking the court to take such action.8 6 Critical here
is Rule 979(e), which states:
An order of the Supreme Court directing depublication of an opin-
ion in the Official Reports shall not be deemed an expression of
opinion of the Supreme Court of the correctness of the result
reached by the decision or of any of the law set forth in the
opinion.87
This bland and convoluted language, if taken literally, packed dy-
namite. Under the traditional understanding of depublication, after
all, it had been thought that a depublication order was precisely an
expression of opinion by the supreme court regarding the correctness
of the result reached or the opinion produced by the court of appeal.
The question thus presented itself whether Rule 979(e) should be
taken seriously-whether the rule meant what it said.
As the first step in answering this question, one might look for
any light shed by the "legislative history" of the rule. So far as ap-
peared, however, there was no legislative history. Rule 979 was
adopted in mysterious fashion, doing full honor to the tradition of se-
crecy that has always surrounded depublication. The rule appeared to
spring full-blown from the brow of the supreme court. Unlike other
Rules of Court, it was not submitted to the Judicial Council, put out
for public comment, or otherwise made known by the court prior to its
83. CAL. CT. R. 979.
84. See Uelmen, supra note 25, at 29.
85. See supra note 1; Barnett, supra note 1, at 1034 n.7.
86. CAL. Or. R. 979. A request for depublication may be made to the supreme court
by any person within 30 days after the court of appeal decision becomes final (Rule
979(a)); the court of appeal or any person may submit a response within 10 days (Rule
979(b)); the supreme court shall send notice of its action to each party to the case and to
any person who has requested depublication (Rule 979(c)); and nothing in the rule limits
the supreme court's power, on its own motion, to order an opinion depublished at any time
(Rule 979(d)).
87. CAL. Or. R. 979(e).
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adoption. Indeed, it was not publicly announced until one day after it
had gone into effect.88
It turns out, however, that Rule 979 had a distinct legislative his-
tory, an unusual one that is quite helpful in interpreting Rule 979(e).
(2) The Legislative History of Rule 979
The author of the draft that became Rule 979 was Howard C.
Cohen, a staff attorney with Appellate Defenders, Inc., in San Diego.
Mr. Cohen says he was prompted to draft a depublication rule for the
supreme court when an appellate opinion favorable to his office was
depublished on his opponent's request and without notice to him that
such a request had been made.89 Offended by the lack of notice, and
observing that the supreme court had no rule requiring notice or
otherwise governing requests for depublication, Mr. Cohen sat down
and drafted such a rule for the court.90
He submitted his draft to the Appellate Court Committee of the
San Diego County Bar Association. The draft contained, along with
procedures for requesting and opposing depublication, essentially the
language now in Rule 979(e), stating that depublication "shall not be
deemed an expression of opinion of the Supreme Court .... " 91 The
discussion in the Appellate Court Committee focused on this provi-
sion. "Much of the discussion went to the 'precedential' effect, if any,
88. See Hearsay: New Court, New Rules, CAL. LAW., Aug. 1990, at 18; Philip Car-
rizosa, Depublish Time Limit Is Adopted, S.F. DAILY J., July 3, 1990, at 7. According to the
former account:
A court spokeswoman explained that comments were unnecessary because this
rule involves the court itself. When a reporter noted that a public hearing was
held before publication rules were last changed in 1982, the spokeswoman con-
sulted with members of the court and returned with this reply: "'That was a differ-
ent court."
Hearsay: New Court, New Rules, supra, at 18.
89. Letter from Howard C. Cohen, Staff Attorney, Appellate Defenders, Inc., to Ste-
phen R. Barnett (Nov. 12, 1993) (on file with the Hastings Law Journal) [hereinafter Co-
hen Letter]. Mr. Cohen states that a petition for review filed by a deputy attorney general
in the case had been denied by the supreme court, as untimely, and then, "long after the
appellate opinion had become final, out of the blue the opinion was decertified." Mr.
Cohen says he called the supreme court and was informed that the depublication had been
sought by the deputy attorney general. "Neither the attorney of record nor I as the super-
vising staff attorney had received any notice from the deputy attorney general," he writes.
Id. Mr. Cohen identifies the case as People v. Matus, 203 Cal. App. 3d 1099, 250 Cal. Rptr.
414 (1988), which became final (as modified) on October 15, 1988, and was depublished on
February 2, 1989. Telephone Interview with Howard C. Cohen, supra note 43.
90. Cohen Letter, supra note 89.
91. Id.
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to be accorded a depublication," Mr. Cohen writes.92 His original in-
tent in drafting the provision was "to mirror subdivision (c) of Rule
978," which states that a supreme court order directing publication of
a court of appeal opinion "shall not be deemed an expression of opin-
ion of the Supreme Court of the correctness of the result reached by
the decision or of any of the law set forth in the opinion."93 Mr. Co-
hen also had in mind that "there could be various reasons why the
Supreme Court would depublish an opinion," such as "undesired, gra-
tuitous dictum"; and that observers might be "unable to divine which
issue(s) in a multiple issue case caused the Supreme Court's action. ' 94
A final reason behind his formulation of Rule 979(e), Mr. Cohen
says, was that "the impact of depublication was suspect given People v.
Cruz ... and what followed." 95 He then relates the story, already
recounted here, of how the decision in People v. Cruz, relying on
depublication orders (and favoring Mr. Cohen's clients), was undone
in In re Huffinan by the supreme court's agreement with the depub-
lished opinions.96
The Appellate Court Committee, after its discussion, approved
Mr. Cohen's proposed rule as drafted. The Committee then, on May
15, 1990, sent the draft to Chief Justice Malcolm M. Lucas of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court and requested that the court adopt the rule.97
The Committee's letter to the Chief Justice devoted a paragraph to
the proposed Rule 979(e), disclosing a difference of views within the
committee:
The majority of our Committee thought this provision, paralleling a
similar provision on publication, was a good idea, and was necessary
to prohibit erroneous inferences from being drawn. Several Com-
mittee members expressed concerns about whether or not this as-
pect of the rule reflected actual practice and whether or not the rule
might be construed as limiting comment on what depublication
might mean.98
The rest is known. Six weeks later the court, acting without pub-
lic notice or comment, adopted Rule 979, substantially in the form
drafted by Mr. Cohen and submitted by the Appellate Court Commit-
92. Id.
93. Id.; CAL. Or. R. 978(c).
94. Cohen Letter, supra note 89.
95. Id.
96. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 26-44.
97. Letter from David Kay, Chairperson, Appellate Court Committee, San Diego
County Bar Association, to The Honorable Malcolm M. Lucas (May 15, 1990) (attaching
draft rule) (on file with the Hastings Law Journal) [hereinafter Kay Letter].
98. I&
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tee. 99 If the supreme court shared any of the Committee's disagree-
ment over proposed Rule 979(e), this was not evident either in its
action or in the text of the rule as adopted. In a letter of thanks to the
Appellate Court Committee dated June 29, 1990, the supreme court's
clerk enclosed the new Rule 979, "adopted by the Supreme Court at
its conference last Wednesday," and stated: "The proposed rule in-
cluded with your letter was of considerable help to the Court." 1°°
(3) The Puzzle of Rule 979(e)
Rule 979(e) at first was a puzzle, a launching pad for diametri-
cally opposed reactions. Since a literal reading of the rule contra-
dicted what almost everyone had understood about the meaning of
depublication, one reaction was to refuse to take the rule seriously-
to dismiss it as meaningless verbiage, or a mistake by the court, or a
preposterous denial of what everyone knew. Professor Kelso takes
99. Compare CAL. CT. R. 979 with draft attached to Kay Letter, supra note 97. Some
of the differences between the San Diego draft and the eventual Rule 979, though minor,
are worth noting:
(1) On the question of nomenclature (see supra note 1), although the San Diego draft
rule used "depublication" in its title, as does the eventual rule, the body of the San Diego
rule used only "decertification" or its variants (eight times). The supreme court replaced
all these with "depublication" or its variants. CAL. COr. R. 979.
(2) The San Diego draft required requests for depublication to be made to the court
within 60 days after either the filing of the petition for review or the date the court of
appeal decision became final; the supreme court shortened this to 30 days after the deci-
sion became final. CAL. Cr. R. 979(a).
(3) The San Diego draft allowed 30 days for responses to a request for depublication;
the supreme court made it 10 days. CAL. CT. R. 979(b).
(4) Although Mr. Kay's letter stated that the San Diego rule "would not limit the
Supreme Court's power to depublish at any time," Kay Letter, supra note 97, nothing in
the San Diego draft made this explicit. The suprenie court made it explicit. CAL. Cr. R.
979(d).
(5) The San Diego draft stated that a depublication order should not be deemed an
expression of opinion by the supreme court "of the incorrectness of the result reached by
the decision or of any of the law set forth in the opinion" (emphasis added). The supreme
court changed the emphasized word to "correctness," thus cementing the parallel with
Rule 978(c)'s provision concerning the effect of an order directing publication of an
opinion.
100. Letter from Robert F. Wandruff, Court Administrator and Clerk of the California
Supreme Court, by John C. Rossi, Assistant Clerk-Administrator, to Mr. David Kay (June
29, 1990) (on file with the Hastings Law Journal). I have previously claimed for myself
some possible role in inducing the court's adoption of Rule 979, based on an article of mine
published in June 1990 that criticized the court for having no rule about depublication.
Stephen R. Barnett, The Death of Oral Argument, CAL. LAW., June 1990, at 45; see Bar-
nett, supra note 1, at 1048 n.63. I see no reason to retract that claim. The court in June
1990 may fortuitously have found in its in-box both my article and, as if in response, the
San Diego draft rule.
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this stance in declaring, "This rule simply is not credible."'' 1 Alterna-
tively, one could take the rule at face value. On this view, the
supreme court may well have an opinion about the correctness of a
depublished case, but the rule means what it says in declaring that the
depublication order "shall not be deemed"'0 2 an expression of opinion
by the court. On the question discussed by the Appellate Court Com-
mittee in San Diego-"the 'precedential' effect, if any, to be accorded
a depublication"' 3-the answer is none. A depublication order has
no "affirmative" effect as a "signal," a "message," or "guidance" from
the supreme court. It has only the "negative" effect, under Rule
977(a), of eliminating the court of appeal opinion as one that may be
"cited" or "relied on." Lower courts thus remain free to replicate
both the result and the reasoning of a depublished opinion, as long as
they do so without giving the opinion any precedential weight-that
is, without "citing" or "relying on" it.
The legislative history, we now know, tends to support the latter
view of the rule. The language of Rule 979(e) was drafted by Mr.
Cohen to effectuate this view. The issue was debated in the Appellate
Court Committee, with this view upheld, and was flagged for the
supreme court.'04 The rule's literal meaning was its intended
meaning.
(4) Rule 979(e) in the Courts of Appeal
The courts of appeal, in reaction to Rule 979(e), began splitting
into the two interpretive camps. Thus in People v. Dee,'05 decided a
month after Rule 979(e) was adopted, the supreme court once again
had depublished one line of court of appeal opinions and left the op-
posing line standing. The court of appeal concluded that "[t]he
message from the Supreme Court is obvious"-the depublished opin-
ions were wrong and the opposing ones correct.' °6 Confronting Rule
979(e), the court said first that since these depublication orders pre-
dated the rule, it did not apply to them. Second, "given the manner in
which the Supreme Court has dealt" with the two lines of cases, "to
insist that those depublication orders are without significance would
be to perpetuate a myth.' 0 7 In short, the court rejected the rule.108
101. Kelso, supra note 1, at 495 n.221.
102. CAL- Cr. R. 979(e) (emphasis added).
103. See Cohen Letter, supra note 89.
104. See Kay Letter, supra note 97; text accompanying note 97.
105. 222 Cal. App. 3d 760, 272 Cal. Rptr. 208 (1990).
106. Id at 763, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
107. Id. at 765, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 211.
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From the other camp came People v. McClanahan.'0 9 The court
there faced a similar split, with the supreme court having depublished
''at least two" cases going one way and having left on the books two
opposing precedents. 10 Although "acutely aware" of the depublica-
tions,"' the court refused to follow the two published decisions and
agreed with the depublished ones." 2 It explained: "Following the
command of California Rules of Court, rule 979(e), . . .we cannot
consider the depublication orders as 'an expression of opinion of the
Supreme Court .... 111113
When the supreme court granted review of McClanahan, a tradi-
tionalist might have expected the court to chastise the court of appeal
for not getting the "message" that the court found something "wrong"
with the depublished opinions. Instead the supreme court affirmed,
itself agreeing with the depublished opinions." 4 The court did not, as
it had in Huffman, acknowledge that it had depublished cases with
which it was now agreeing." 5 Nor did the court refer to the depub-
lished cases, as did the court of appeal in McClanahan. The court in
no way acknowledged the existence of the decisions it was following.
As the law stood in early 1993, then, the courts of appeal were
split on the meaning of Rule 979(e). I argued at the time that the
second camp would and should prevail."16 This was both because of
the implications of McClanahan-I could have added Huffman and
Turner-and, more important, because Rule 979(e) was clear and
should be read to mean what it said." 7 (I could have pointed as well
108. Compare also In re Anita G., 15 Cal. App. 4th 1045, 1056-59, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 265,
274 (Sills, P.J., dissenting), review granted, 842 P.2d 99, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 800 (1992), trans-
ferred to court of appeal, 856 P.2d 1133, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277 (1993) (dissent wanting to wait
for possible "signal" from supreme court's action on pending request for depublication),
with Anita G., 15 Cal. App. 4th at 1053 n.10, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 270 n.10 (majority saying it
would make no difference, quoting Rule 979(e)).
109. 7 Cal. App. 4th 1712, 281 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1991), affd, 3 Cal. 4th 860, 838 P.2d 241,
12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 719 (1992).
110. See id. at 1719 n.3, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 851 n.3.
111. Id. at 1719 n.3, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 851 n.3.
112. Id. at 1724, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
113. Id. at 1719 n.3,281 Cal. Rptr. at 851 n.3; see also County of Los Angeles v. County
Assessment App. Bd. No. 1, 13 Cal. App. 4th 102, 109-10, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 479, 483-84
(1993) (rejecting reliance on depublication order and citing Rule 979(e)).
114. People v. McClanahan, 3 Cal. 4th 860, 867-72, 838 P.2d 241, 246-49, 12 Cal. Rptr.
2d 719, 724-27 (1992).
115. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
116. Barnett, supra note 1, at 1052.
117. Id.
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to the legislative history of the rule.) The supreme court, however,
had not yet said anything about Rule 979(e).
F. People v. Saunders. Rule 979(e) Confirmed
In People v. Saunders,118 the court spoke. Decided July 1, 1993,
Saunders involved the curious but recurring situation where, after a
guilty verdict, the trial judge mistakenly discharges the jury before it
can consider the truth of prior convictions alleged for the purpose of
enhancing the punishment. The court held, five to two, that by failing
to object to the jury's discharge the defendant had waived his statu-
tory right to have the priors considered by that jury.119 The court fur-
ther held that impaneling a new jury to hear the priors did not put the
defendant in double jeopardy under either the United States or the
California constitutions. 120
Again there were two opposing lines of court of appeal opinions,
one published and one depublished. The story started with People v.
Wojahn,'2' holding that double jeopardy barred trial of the priors af-
ter the first jury was discharged. Two subsequent cases, People v.
Laury'22 and People v. Casillas (in a plurality opinion),123 disagreed
with Wojahn. A third case, People v. Hockersmith,124 agreed with
Wojahn. The supreme court, acting on a single day in 1990, denied
review of Hockersmith and depublished both Laury and Casillas.25
These judicial tracks previously had been studied by the court of
appeal in People v. Dee.126 That court observed that the supreme
court's actions had left Hockersmith as "the only published post-
118. 5 Cal. 4th 580, 853 P.2d 1093, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 638 (1993).
119. Id. at 591, 853 P.2d at 1098, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 643. This right arises from Penal
Code Sections 1025 and 1164. See id. at 587-89, 853 P.2d at 1095-98, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
640-43.
120. Id. at 592-97, 852 P.2d at 1099-1102, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 644-47.
121. 150 Cal. App. 3d 1024, 198 Cal. Rptr. 277 (1984).
122. 209 Cal. App. 3d 713, 257 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1989), ordered depublished, California
Supreme Court Minutes, Apr. 26, 1990, in CAL. OFFICIAL REP. (advance sheet), May 31,
1990, at 3.
123. 215 Cal. App. 3d 1055,263 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1989), ordered depublished, California
Supreme Court Minutes, Apr. 26, 1990, in CAL. OFFICIAL RP. (advance sheet), May 31,
1990, at 3. The plurality opinion in Casillas rejected Wojahn's double jeopardy analysis but
reached the same result on other grounds. Id. at 1062 & n.4, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 919 & n.4.
124. 217 Cal. App. 3d 968, 266 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1990).
125. See California Supreme Court Minutes, Apr. 26, 1990, in CAL. OFCIAL RP.
(advance sheet), May 31, 1990, at 3.
126. 222 Cal. App. 3d 760, 272 Cal. Rptr. 208 (1990); see supra text accompanying
notes 105-108.
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Wojahn opinion."'127  It thus concluded: "The message from the
Supreme Court is obvious: Hockersmith and Wojahn were correct,
and Laury and the plurality in Casillas were wrong. There is no other
fathomable reason for the Supreme Court's action.' 1 28 As for Rule
979(e), the court in Dee, as already noted, held first that the rule did
not apply "retroactively" and, second, that "to insist that those depub-
lication orders are without significance would be to perpetuate a
myth."'
29
In Saunders, the supreme court perpetuated that myth. The court
held that Wojahn was wrong-that double jeopardy did not bar im-
paneling a new jury to hear the priors.130 It further held that although
the defendant had a statutory right to have the first jury hear the pri-
ors, he had waived that right by not objecting to the jury's dis-
charge. 131 The court thus was compelled, in the face of a dissent by
Justice Joyce Kennard, to confront its depublications of Laury and
Casillas and hence the meaning of depublication under Rule 979(e).
Justice Kennard launched the debate. While expressing no opin-
ion on the merits of the double jeopardy issue, 132 she disagreed with
the majority's decision of the statutory-waiver issue and, in addition,
with its "retroactive" application of that decision.' 33 Justice Kennard
argued that the court, despite its present rejection of Wojahn's double
jeopardy holding, had "consistently endorsed" that holding by its
depublications of Laury and Casillas and its denial of review in Hock-
ersmith.134 And since Wojahn and its progeny did not require that the
defense object to the jury's discharge in order to assert the double
jeopardy claim, she thought it unfair for the court to apply retroac-
tively its "new rule" requiring such an objection.' 35
127. Dee, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 763, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
128. Id. at 763, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
129. Id. at 765, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 211; see supra text accompanying notes 106-107.
130. Saunders, 5 Cal. 4th at 592-97, 853 P.2d at 1099-1102, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 644-47.
131. Id. at 592-97, 853 P.2d at 1095-99, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 640-44.
132. Id. at 602 n.2, 853 P.2d at 1105 n.2, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650 n.2 (Kennard, J.,
dissenting).
133. Id. at 606, 853 P.2d at 1108, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 653 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 607, 853 P.2d at 1109, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 654 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
Justice Kennard speaks of denials of review in the plural-e.g., "denying review of Courts
of Appeal decisions that followed Wojahn;" "denials of review in some cases." Id., 853
P.2d at 1109, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 654. However, she cites-and there appears to have
been-only one such case, Hockersmith.
135. Id. at 606, 853 P.2d at 1108, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 653 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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Ironically, the principal case Justice Kennard cited for this claim
of justified reliance on pre-existing law was Turner.136 While Justice
Kennard was claiming justified reliance on depublication orders, the
court in Turner upheld a claim of justified reliance on depublished
opinions, the opposite of depublication orders.' 37 Both kinds of reli-
ance, however, would seem to violate Rules of Court, as a subsequent
discussion will develop.' 38
In support of her position in Saunders, Justice Kennard endorsed
the view of depublication taken by the court of appeal in Dee. The
supreme court's depublications and denials of review following
Wojahn "cannot simply be dismissed as meaningless," she wrote. 39
She then quoted the statement of the court in Dee about
"perpetuat[ing] a myth.'u4°
The Saunders majority, in reply, said Justice Kennard erred in
concluding "that by denying review in some cases and ordering
depublication of the opinions in others, this court 'endorsed' the deci-
sion in Wojahn.' 141 Denials of review are not expressions of opinion
on the merits, the court said.142 It continued: "Consistently with the
foregoing principles, rule 979(e) of the California Rules of Court,
adopted in 1990, declares ... ."'43-whereupon the court quoted the
rule.4
"In any event," the court continued, "Wojahn was based entirely
on double jeopardy principles."' 45 Hence the defendant in Saunders
could not be deemed to have relied on Wojahn in failing to assert his
statutory right by objecting to the jury's discharge. 146
While the Saunders majority and Justice Kennard thus took op-
posing views of the meaning of depublication-the other dissenter,
Justice Stanley Mosk, stayed out of this fray-one suspects that some-
136. Id. at 606,853 P.2d at 1108-09,20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 653-54 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 45-82.
138. See infra text accompanying notes 199-201.
139. Saunders, 5 Cal. 4th at 608, 853 P.2d at 1110, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 655 (Kennard, J.,
dissenting).
140. Id. at 608, 853 P.2d at 1110, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 655 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 592 n.8, 853 P.2d at 1098-99 n.8, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 643-44 n.8.
142. Id. at 592 n.8, 853 P.2d at 1098-99 n.8, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 643-44 n.8 (citing
Camper v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 3 Cal. 4th 679, 689 n.8, 836 P.2d 888, 894 n.8, 12
Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 107 n.8 (1992)).
143. Id. at 592 n.8, 853 P.2d at 1098-99 n.8, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 643-44 n.8. The plural
"foregoing principles" here is puzzling, since the court has noted only one principle-that
denial of review is not an expression on the merits.
144. Id. at 592 n.8, 853 P.2d at 1098-99 n.8, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 643-44 n.8.
145. Id. at 592 n.8, 853 P.2d at 1098-99 n.8, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 643-44 n.8.
146. Id. at 592 n.8, 853 P.2d at 1098-99 n.8, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 643-44 n.8.
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thing else was going on as well. As had been true in the courts of
appeal, 147 the justices' views on depublication appeared to be driven,
at least in part, by their views on the merits of the case before them.
This suspicion is heightened by the rather perfunctory tone in which
both sides made their depublication arguments. The majority, after
denying that the court had "endorsed" Wojahn, simply quoted Rule
979(e), without saying anything in its own words-and passed immedi-
ately to another argument, prefaced by "[i]n any event."' 48 Justice
Kennard did not herself confront Rule 979(e), but simply quoted what
the Dee court said about it.149
Nonetheless, the justices on both sides would seem to be commit-
ted now to the views on depublication they expressed in Saunders.
Justice Kennard, having found significance in the court's record of
depublishing cases going one way and denying review of a case going
the other way, cannot very well claim that depublication is without
significance. The majority, having quoted Rule 979(e) to show the er-
ror of Justice Kennard's approach, cannot very well deny that the rule
means what it says, or argue that a depublication order sends a
"message" or provides "guidance" from the court. And the majority
makes the law. Thus the court is now committed to the "narrow" view
of depublication-the "face value" reading of Rule 979(e)-that it
embraced in Saunders.
This is especially so because other indications from the court
point in the same direction. There is the holding of Turner, which
found the trial counsel justified in relying on depublished cases. 150
There is the language and also the legislative history of Rule 979(e)
itself.15' And there are now at least three cases-Huffman, McClana-
han, and Saunders152-in which the court ultimately has agreed with
opinions it had depublished and disagreed with opposing opinions it
had left on the books. The court thus not only has said that depublica-
147. See Barnett, supra note 1, at 1051-52.
148. Saunders, 5 Cal. 4th at 592 n.8, 853 P.2d at 1098-99 n.8, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 643-44
n.8.
149. Id. at 607-08, 853 P.2d at 1110, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 655 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
150. Turner, 50 Cal. 3d at 704-05 & n.18, 789 P.2d at 906-07 & n.18, 268 Cal. Rptr. at
725-26 & n.18; see supra text accompanying notes 53-55. While the trial counsel's conduct
thus may have been consistent with (the subsequently adopted) Rule 979(e), it may have
violated Rule 977(a). See infra text accompanying note 193.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 89-100.
152. Huffinan, 42 Cal. 3d at 554, 724 P.2d at 475,229 Cal. Rptr. at 789; McClanahan, 3
Cal. 4th at 867-72, 838 P.2d at 246-49, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 724-27; Saunders, 5 Cal. 4th at
592-97, 853 P.2d at 1099-1102, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 644-47; see supra text accompanying
notes 26-42, 109-117, 118-152.
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tion shall not be deemed an expression of opinion by the court; it has
put its judicial power where its mouth is.
G. The Effect of Depublication Under Rule 979(e) and Saunders
(1) The Depublication Order as a Precedent
Given Rule 979(e) and its confirmation in Saunders, depublica-
tion now would appear to have a meaning and effect quite different
from what was originally the case. Depublication evidently was con-
ceived to let the supreme court quickly and easily-without expending
the time and effort needed to review a case and decide it-give "gui-
dance" to the lower courts and steer them away from error.153
Depublication provided that guidance, not just by erasing the depub-
lished opinion as a citable precedent, but also by making an affirma-
tive statement that functioned as a sort of opposing precedent. When
Justice Grodin explained that the court considered a depublished
opinion to be "wrong in some significant way," and to stand for "what
the court considers the law is not,"'1 54 he was describing not only the
court's motivation for depublishing the opinion, but also a message
the court was conveying to the lower courts and lawyers of California.
The message was to steer away from that opinion. As Justice Donald
King wrote for the court of appeal in Dee: "It is hardly unprece-
dented for the Courts of Appeal to seek implicit guidance from denial
of review and depublication; we have just not been very candid about
doing so.... [P]erhaps the time has come for a bit more candor."' 55
That time did not come. Dee was disapproved in Saunders.156
In the wake of Rule 979(e) and Saunders, depublication no longer
provides lower courts with "guidance" by way of an affirmative prece-
dent opposed to the depublished opinion. The rule states squarely
that a depublication order "shall not be deemed an expression of
opinion of the Supreme Court . . ."; Saunders holds that the rule
means what it says; and the supreme court has put teeth in the rule by
three times vindicating depublished opinions over ones it had left
standing. Lawyers and lower courts now have that "message" from
the supreme court.
Lawyers, to be sure, have a duty to study trends in the law and to
attempt to anticipate the decisions of the courts. A Rule of Court that
told lawyers they could not, in their own minds, "deem" a depublica-
153. See Bird, supra note 18; Grodin, supra note 16, at 522.
154. Grodin, supra note 16, at 514-15, 522.
155. Dee, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 764, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
156. Saunders, 5 Cal. 4th at 597 n.9, 853 P.2d at 1102 n.9, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 647 n.9.
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tion order an expression of opinion by the supreme court-though the
order might in fact express such an opinion-would be not only an
effort at thought control, but a command that lawyers not do their job.
Lawyers hardly would, and hardly should, obey such an edict. Rule
979(e) thus will not prevent lawyers from continuing to study both
depublication orders and depublished opinions in order to anticipate
court decisions. What they will learn from such study, however, is not
what they once would have learned. Lawyers who read a depublica-
tion order in the traditional way, as "guidance" on what "the law is
not," may find that they are wrong, even in the supreme court itself.
That is what the lawyers in Huffman, McClanahan, and Saunders
would have found.
In the lower courts, moreover, Rule 979(e) has a stronger effect.
While lawyers are obliged for the sake of their clients to try to antici-
pate court decisions, lower-court judges have no business trying to an-
ticipate decisions of the supreme court on grounds the supreme court
tells them to ignore. While they might reduce their reversal rates (or
depublication rates) that way, that is not a legitimate endeavor for
judges when it flouts the supreme court's instructions and a Rule of
Court. Lower-court judges thus have a duty to obey Rule 979(e) and
to decline to treat a depublication order as an expression of opinion
by the supreme court.
And then, this becomes the judicial behavior that lawyers should
anticipate from the lower courts. In predicting the decisions of those
courts, the opinion actually held by the supreme court about the mer-
its of a depublished case should in fact be irrelevant. Now that the
lower courts have the supreme court's command not to regard depub-
lication orders as precedents, and hence its blessing to replicate
depublished opinions (as long as they do so without citing or relying
on those opinions), lawyers must assume that depublication no longer
discredits an opinion. With the scarlet "D" removed, both the result
and the reasoning of a depublished opinion may rise again in a court
that finds them persuasive. The depublication order thus no longer
has any affirmative precedential effect. Its only proper effect is the
"negative" one of eliminating the depublished opinion as a citable
precedent. The next question is what that effect amounts to.
(2) Elimination of the Depublished Opinion As a Citable Precedent
By virtue of Rule 979(e), then, depublication does no more than
render the opinion "unpublished" and thus bring it under Rule 977(a),
which provides that an unpublished opinion "shall not be cited or re-
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lied on" by a court or party in any other case (subject to exceptions
not pertinent here).157 Courts may in fact be "citing" or "relying on"
depublished opinions, but let us put that off for a moment. 58 Here
we take Rule 977(a) at face value and consider what, exactly, is the
impact of depublication if it does prevent the depublished opinion
from being cited or relied on. What does the supreme court achieve
by depublishing the opinion, as compared with leaving it on the
books?
Eliminating the "erroneous"' 5 9 opinion as a citable precedent has
differing impacts on trial courts and the courts of appeal. The clearest
impact is on trial courts: They are not bound by the opinion, as they
would have been if it had remained published (provided there was no
published appellate opinion going the other way).' 60 But even this
impact is limited, in two ways. First, the trial courts would have been
bound only by "erroneous" holding in the published opinion, not by
dictum.' 6' The late Chief Justice Wright and Justice Grodin both have
said that the court in depublishing a case usually agrees with the result
and disagrees only with some language or reasoning in the opinion. 62
The "error," then, might well be dictum, which would not have bound
the trial courts anyway. Second, even when the error was in holding,
it would have bound trial courts only if there was no published appel-
late opinion going the other way,' 63 and only until there was such an
opinion. If the first appellate opinion indeed was "erroneous," an ap-
pellate opinion going the other way might well have come into exist-
157. CAL- C. R. 977(a); see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
158. See infra text accompanying notes 169-233.
159. To assume that the supreme court regards the opinion as "erroneous" may seem
paradoxical and inconsistent with much in the previous pages, as well as with the mandate
of Rule 979(e) that a depublication order "shall not be deemed an expression of opinion"
by the supreme court. There is, indeed, something of Alice in Wonderland in any consider-
ation of depublication under Rule 979(e). We are talking here, however, about whether
the supreme court has an opinion about the depublished case, not about whether the
depublication order should be "deemed" an expression of opinion by the court. See supra
text accompanying notes 101-104. In order to assess depublication's effectiveness, one
must assume something about the court's reason for depublishing an opinion. Moreover, it
is one thing for the court to say the depublication order itself shall not be given meaning,
and another thing for us to analyze the effect the order admittedly has in eliminating the
depublished opinion as a citable precedent. Cf. Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Con-
duct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REv. 625 (1984).
160. Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 57 Cal. 2d 450, 455, 369 P.2d 937, 940, 20
Cal. Rptr. 321, 324 (1960).
161. "No court is required to follow another court's dicta." Indiana Harbor Belt R.R.
Co.. v. American Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1176 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 17, 19-21.
163. Auto Equity Sales, 57 Cal. 2d at 455, 369 P.2d at 940, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
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ence as soon as a trial court decision following the first opinion was
appealed.
For the courts of appeal, depublication eliminates as a citable pre-
cedent an opinion they were not bound to follow anyway. 164 To be
sure, courts of appeal would have been more likely to follow the pub-
lished opinion than they are to replicate it once it is depublished. This
might be true for two reasons. First, the published opinion would
have been an "official" precedent, though not a binding one-and the
depublished opinion is something less. Second, since the depublished
opinion may not be "cited or relied on," that opinion, in theory, is less
likely to come to a court's attention than if it had remained published.
The first reason is weakened under the regime of Rule 979(e) and
Saunders; the difference in precedential effect between published and
depublished opinions is reduced. It is not easy to define the "prece-
dential effect" of a published California court of appeal decision for
other California courts of appeal-the effect of a full-fledged, or "offi-
cial," precedent that nonetheless may freely be rejected. At the most,
there is a sort of rebuttable presumption that another court of appeal
will follow the decision (absent a published decision the other way). 165
At the least, the decision will be followed only by a court that finds it
persuasive, so there is no precedential effect. 166
164. "A decision of a court of appeal is not binding in the courts of appeal. One dis-
trict or division may refuse to follow a prior decision of a district or decision, for the same
reasons that influence the federal Courts of Appeals of the various circuits to make in-
dependent decisions." 9 B.E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE § 772, at 740-41 (3d ed.
1985); see also McCallum v. McCallum, 190 Cal. App. 3d 308, 315 n.4, 235 Cal. Rptr. 396,
400 n.4 (1987); McGlothlen v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 71 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 1017,
140 Cal. Rptr. 168, 176 (1977); Philip Hager, The Workhorses: California's Appeal Courts,
S.F. DAILY J., Jan. 18, 1994, at 1, 7 (stating that panels of California courts of appeal "func-
tion as separate courts, free to disregard rulings of other divisions, even if they are in the
same district"). For proof, see the cases cited throughout this Comment that involve con-
flicting lines of authority in the courts of appeal.
165. See, e.g., Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. County of Santa Clara, 187 Cal. App. 3d 480,
485, 231 Cal. Rptr. 702, 704 (1986) ("[W]e ordinarily follow the decisions of other districts
without good reason to disagree .... ).
166. See, e.g., Los Angeles Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles, 163 Cal.
App. 3d 1141, 1147, 209 Cal. Rptr. 890, 893 (1985) ("[Tlhe reasoning and conclusions ex-
pressed in that opinion are sound and we therefore follow them .... ). See also the paper
by then-court of appeal justice Otto M. Kaus, Conflicting Court of Appeal Decisions: Pre-
cedent Is a Many Splendored Thing or Let Thirteen Flowers Bloom, at 2 (n.d.) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with the Hastings Law Journal) ("There are, of course, thousands
of Court of Appeal cases which, after citing or referring to decisions of other districts,
proceed to follow and apply them. One gathers, however, that they do so because they
agree with the decision they follow, not because they are obliged to do so, whether they
agree or not.").
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Depublished opinions, meanwhile, are not "official" precedents,
but no longer are they discredited, either. Courts of appeal now have
a green light to reach the same result and employ the same reasoning
as a depublished opinion, as long as they do so without citing or rely-
ing on that opinion. (The same is true for trial courts, unless there is a
published appellate opinion going the other way.) The depublished
opinion, moreover, is in fact a precedent. Judges trained and func-
tioning in a system of stare decisis have an ingrained inclination to
follow precedent.167 It therefore seems that, when there is no pub-
lished appellate opinion opposing the depublished one, the depub-
lished one is more likely than not to be "followed." It would be less
likely than a published opinion, but still more likely than not. And
when there is a published appellate opinion opposing the depublished
one, courts of appeal-given their traditional independence and tak-
ing account of Huffman, McClanahan, and Saunders-seem less likely
to defer to the published opinion than to make their own decision on
the merits between the opposing precedents. In sum, the effect of de-
nying the depublished opinion the status of an "official" precedent
retains some force, but probably not very much.168
167. In at least one instance, a depublished California opinion has been cited and fol-
lowed like any other case by courts of another state. See Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 597 A.2d
543, 549-50 & n.5 (N.J. Super. 1991); Hirsch v. General Motors Corp., 628 A.2d 1108,1115,
1121 (NJ. Super. 1993). Both cases cite fully (with both Cal. App. and Cal. Rptr. cites)
and follow County of Solano v. Delancy, 215 Cal. App. 3d. 1232,264 Cal. Rptr. 721 (1989),
ordered depublished, California Supreme Court Minutes, Feb. 1, 1990, in CAL. OMFCIAL
REP. (advance sheet), Mar. 8, 1990, at 6, concerning the tort of spoliation of evidence.
Vviano includes the depublication order as part of the citation, 597 A.2d at 550 & n.5, but
apparently treats the case no differently because of it. Hirsch ignores the depublication.
See 628 A.2d at 1115.
168. One might illustrate the changed meaning of depublication by reference to a hier-
archy of judicial precedent for opinions of the California courts of appeal. In descending
order of authority, the ranks would be:
1. Binding Precedents
2. Official Precedents
3. De Facto Precedents
4. Discredited Precedents.
The only "binding precedents" are published court of appeal opinions in their effect on
trial courts (absent a published court of appeal opinion the other way). "Official prece-
dents" are published court of appeal opinions in their effect on courts of appeal. This
effect is not binding but is otherwise uncertain. It may carry some indeterminate "prece-
dential weight," such as a rebuttable presumption of being followed (absent an opposing
published court of appeal opinion); but it may carry no weight beyond the opinion's inher-
ent persuasiveness. See supra text accompanying notes 163-168. "De facto precedents" are
depublished opinions under the new regime of Rule 979(e) and Saunders-lacking official
"precedential weight," but precedents in fact and hence perhaps more likely than not to be
followed (absent a decision the other way). "Discredited precedents," now an obsolete
category, were depublished opinions under the "traditional understanding." See supra text
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The second possible "negative" effect of depublication rests on
Rule 977(a)'s mandate that a depublished opinion not be "cited" or
"relied on." The theory would be that the opinion is therefore less
likely to come to the attention of a subsequent court and hence to be
capable of influencing that court. Consideration of this effect raises
questions of what it means today to "cite" or "rely on" a judicial opin-
ion, and of how well Rule 977(a) is being obeyed. It turns out that just
as the California Supreme Court has been changing the meaning and
effect of depublication through actions such as Huffman, McClana-
han, Rule 979(e), and Saunders, so too the court has been subverting
the rule against "citing" or "relying on" depublished opinions, and
thereby further weakening the force of depublication. That is the next
topic.
I. Erosion of the Rule Against "Citing" or "Relying On"
Depublished Opinions
A. Introduction: Declaring Judicial Opinions "Unpublished" and
Banning Their "Citation"
In a system of law based on precedent, rules declaring some judi-
cial opinions "unpublished" and prohibiting their "citation" have al-
ways been problematic. 169 These opinions, and the decisions they
explain, in fact are precedents. Declaring them not to be citable
precedents prevents lawyers from making their own best judgments
about relevant precedents and thus constrains the natural develop-
ment of the law. Systems of nonpublication also have been thought,
as Professor Kelso notes, 170 to bestow an unfair advantage on litigants
who possess the resources to collect and study unpublished opinions
so as to exploit, sub silentio, their status as actual precedents.
Depublished opinions form a small and select subgroup of unpub-
lished opinions, representing about one percent of the total' 7 ' and
accompanying notes 16-23. The effect of the changed meaning of depublication thus has
been to move depublished opinions up from "discredited" precedents to "de facto" ones,
narrowing the difference between them and the "official" precedents that published opin-
ions represent.
169. See PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 36-43 (1976).
170. Kelso, supra note 1, at 491.
171. The latest judicial statistics reported by the Judicial Council of California show
11,003 appeals disposed of by the courts of appeal by written opinion in fiscal year 1991-92.
II JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 4, at 20. Ten percent of these opinions
were published, id. at 31, so there were approximately 9,900 unpublished opinions. Mean-
while, according to Dean Uelmen, during the roughly equivalent period from April 1, 1991
to March 31, 1992, the California Supreme Court depublished 101 opinions. Uelmen,
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possessing special importance and visibility. Depublished opinions
are set apart from other unpublished opinions by these traits: (1)
They are important, as attested by the court of appeal in certifying
them for publication in the Official Reports under the standards of
Rule 976;172 (2) They were published originally in the Official Reports,
or at least the advance sheets of those Reports; they thus carry a Cal.
App. citation (which is permanent), 173 and in addition they are pub-
lished (permanently) in the unofficial California Reporter and are per-
manently available in Lexis and Westlaw; (3) They have been the
subject of a public judicial action by the California Supreme Court-a
depublication order that is reported in the court's Minutes and hence
in the advance sheets of the official California Reports, and that in-
cludes the Cal. App. citation for the depublished opinion. 174
Depublished opinions always have been accessible to judges and
lawyers, but with obstacles thrown into the path. Thus, the supreme
court's depublication order is reported only in the advance sheets of
the Official Reports. And since the Cal. App. citation included in that
order used to be good only for the advance sheets of the California
Appellate Reports, it used to be necessary to translate that cite into the
Cal. Rptr. citation-or to unearth the Cal. App. advance sheets-in
order to obtain the depublished opinion.
With today's methods of computer-based legal research, all such
obstacles are bypassed. The California Appellate Reports version of
supra note 9, at 1007 n.3, 1022. Thus, counting the depublished opinions as unpublished,
the depublished opinions were roughly 1% of all the unpublished ones. (Despite the de-
secretizing of depublication by adoption of Rule 979 in 1990, see supra text accompanying
notes 83-86, and despite the supreme court's continued depublishing of more cases than it
publishes, see supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text, the Annual Report of the Judicial
Council of California still treats depublication as a state secret (or a skeleton in the closet).
Nothing in the Report's section on the work of the California Supreme Court, either in
statistics or text, acknowledges the existence of depublication. See II JUDICIAL COUNCIL
OF CALIFONIA, supra note 4, at 3-14.)
172. See supra note 6.
173. Although depublication usually occurs in time to pull the opinion before publica-
tion of the bound volume of the California Appellate Reports, the pages where it would
have appeared in that volume are assiduously deleted. See, e.g., 11 Cal. App. 4th 1429
(1992) (stating "Opinion (In re Cadric G.) on pages 1429-1435 omitted," and adding in
footnote that opinion was "[d]eleted on direction of Supreme Court by order dated March
11, 1993"; page 1429 in the bound Cal. App. volume is thus followed by page 1436). Hence
no other case preempts the citation, which thus indelibly identifies the depublished case
not only in its advance sheet incarnation, but also in its permanent recordation in Lexis and
Westlaw and unofficial reporters. See infra note 175 and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., Merrill v. Ballard, 17 Cal. App. 4th 933, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 664 (1993),
ordered depublished, California Supreme Court Minutes, Nov. 10, 1993, in CAL. OFFICIAL
REP. (advance sheet), Jan. 4, 1994, at 4 (giving citation: "17 Cal. App. 4th 933").
March 1994]
the depublished case, along with the Cal. App. citation that identifies
it, is available permanently in Lexis and Westlaw. It is retrievable by
the Cal. App. citation, as well as by the case name or docket number
and by citations to the California Reporter and to Lexis's and
Westlaw's own reporting systems, in addition to other routes. 175
Depublished opinions also are readily available today without
benefit of computer. The supreme court's depublication orders can be
found by date of depublication in either of California's daily opinion
reporting services, which are delivered as supplements to daily legal
newspapers. 7 6 The reports in these services not only include the Cal.
App. citation given by the supreme court, but often are accompanied
by summaries or texts of the depublished opinions provided by the
reporting service. 177
With the aid of these techniques, depublished opinions today are
a regular subject of appellate legal research. As one practitioner has
written: "[N]o appellate lawyer worthy of the name would think of
submitting a brief on an issue of any significance without reviewing
the depublished cases as well as the published ones."'1 78 The same is
true, no doubt, of judges and judicial research attorneys worthy of the
name.
The increased accessibility of depublished opinions may relieve
any unfairness based on the differing resources of litigants, but it puts
new pressure on the tenets of the depublication system holding that
these opinions are "unpublished" and may not be "cited." When
depublished opinions are readily and permanently available in Lexis
and Westlaw, as well as in the California Reporter, there remains only
a narrow and artificial sense in which they are "unpublished." Indeed
175. For example, People v. Rangel, the first of the depublished cases identified in
Footnote Seventeen of Turner (see supra text accompanying notes 58-68), is in Lexis bear-
ing the cites 154 Cal. App. 3d 544 and 201 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1984). (Lexis's own citation
system apparently had not begun in 1984.) People v. Laury, one of the depublished cases
identified in Justice Kennard's dissent in Saunders (see infra text accompanying notes 196-
199), is in Lexis bearing the cites 209 Cal. App. 3d 713, 257 Cal. Rptr. 480, and 1989 Cal.
App. LEXIS 350 (1989). Either case can be found in Lexis by a search using any of those
cites or the case's name and docket number. See infra note 184.
176. These are the Daily Appellate Report, a supplement to the Los Angeles Daily
Journal and the San Francisco Daily Journal, and the California Daily Opinion Service, a
supplement to The Recorder.
177. See, e.g., DAiLY APPELLATE REP., Dec. 6, 1993, at 15211 (reporting supreme
court's depublication on Dec. 1, 1993, of Poss v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 17 Cal.
App. 4th 1507 (1993), and reprinting summary of court of appeal opinion as it originally
appeared in Daily Journal on July 30, 1993 (along with page number where full text of
opinion appeared in Daily Appellate Report on that day)).
178. Kent L. Richland, Depublication, L.A. LAw., Aug.-Sept. 1990, at 52.
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there is only one place, the bound volumes of the California Appellate
Reports, where these opinions are not published. To call them "un-
published" becomes a fiction.
The weight of the policy refusing to treat these opinions as prece-
dents shifts, then, to the mandate that the opinions not be "cited."
The new methods of legal research, however, have also affected what
it means to "cite" a case. Two meanings may be distinguished. To
"cite" a case may mean broadly to name the case and give numbers,
dates, or other identifying indicia by which the case can readily be
found in a legal reporting system. To "cite" a case may also mean,
more narrowly, to name the case and give volume and page numbers,
or some other numerically designated location, where the case can
readily be found in a legal reporting system, especially in a traditional,
book-bound reporter such as the California Appellate Reports or the
California Reporter.
It used to be that the two meanings coalesced. Virtually the only
place to find a case was in the traditional book-bound reporters, and
virtually the only way to find it there was by volume and page
number. (Thus there was a linkage, as well, between decreeing that
depublished opinions not appear in the Official Reports and prohibit-
ing their citation.) Today, the two meanings may diverge. It is far
from clear that a case is not being "cited" unless one gives volume and
page numbers or some other numerically designated location in a re-
porting system. If a case can be found quickly in Lexis or Westlaw by
its name and docket number, for example, it may be that giving that
information constitutes "citing" the case. This is likely to depend, of
course, on the purpose behind the rule that prohibits "citing" the case.
The divergence of meanings invites attempts to have it both ways.
One can give enough information about a depublished case to achieve
the purposes normally gained by citing a case, and yet maintain that
because one did not give the volume and page number in Cal. App. or
Cal. Rptr., one did not "cite" the case in violation of Rule 977(a).
This is what the California Supreme Court, and courts of appeal as
well, increasingly appear to be doing.
If depublished cases can be effectively "cited," the weight of the
depublication system shifts again, coming to bear on the remaining
dictate that such cases not be "relied on." But what it means to "rely
on" a case also comes into question. And again the supreme court,
and courts of appeal as well, appear to be doing what the rule forbids.
Lawyers, however, presumably still feel some inhibition about violat-
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ing a Rule of Court. Hence problems of consistency and moral au-
thority are presented.
The following discussion reviews how the supreme court and
some courts of appeal have been handling Rule 977(a)'s ban on "cit-
ing" or "relying on" depublished opinions. It also considers what
those terms properly mean in this context and appraises the current
status of Rule 977(a), along with the implications of that status for the
practice of depublication.
B. The Deteriorating Authority of Rule 977(a)
(1) In re Huffman
In In re Huffman,179 the supreme court in 1986 was still respectful
of Rule 977(a). In agreeing with appellate opinions it had depub-
lished and disapproving ones it had left standing (Jobinger and its
progeny), the court did not cite the depublished cases, even by name.
It said only: "We ordered that several Court of Appeal decisions
which disagreed with Jobinger not be published.' 180
(2) People v. Turner
In People v. Turner,181 in 1990, the court largely shed those
scruples. The court held that trial counsel was justified in failing to
object to admission of the impeachment priors in view of the result
that had been reached at the time of the trial by the all but one "origi-
nally published"-that is, depublished-court of appeal decisions.182
And in Footnote Seventeen the court first gave the name (and "Cal.
App." designation) of each of those decisions, and then called in its
Reporter of Decisions to add the court of appeal docket number and
date of depublication1 83 Neither tier of the footnote gives a Cal. App.
or Cal. Rptr. citation for any of the depublished opinions, an omission
presumably designed to preserve the claim that those opinions were
not being "cited." But the court's masquerade of letting its Reporter
do the job-as if he were not the court's employee, and his action not
the court's action-suggests that the court had qualms (or a guilty
conscience) about whether the information provided in the toenote
179. 42 Cal. 3d 552, 724 P.2d 475, 229 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1986); see supra text accompany-
ing notes 26-44.
180. Id. at 560 n.6, 724 P.2d at 480 n.6, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 794 n.6.
181. 50 Cal. 3d 668, 789 P.2d 887, 268 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1990); see supra text accompany-
ing notes 45-82.
182. Id. at 704-05 & n.18, 789 P.2d at 905-06 & n.18, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 725-26 & n.18.




really was consistent with the rule. We now examine whether such
qualms were justified.
(3) 'flmer and the Meaning of "Citing" a Case
Thanks to computerized legal research, the information given in
Turner's Footnote Seventeen enables the reader to find each of the
seven depublished cases easily. One can go to Lexis's CAL library,
APP file, for example, and do a search using either the case's name or
its docket number (Lexis's "number" segment), or both combined; or
one can use the case name combined with the date of subsequent
supreme court action. One or more of these searches produces each
of the seven cases.184 Without a computer, moreover, one can use the
date of depublication to find the depublication orders, and hence cita-
tions to the depublished opinions, in the daily opinion reporting serv-
ices or the supreme court's Minutes.
Did the court in Turner "cite" the depublished cases? Most dic-
tionary definitions of "cite" or "citation," in the context of reference
to legal authority, do not require anything very specific. The relevant
definition of the verb "to cite" in Black's Law Dictionary requires
only that one "refer" to a legal authority, or "name" or "mention" it,
in support of some proposition:
To read or refer to legal authorities, in an argument to a court or
elsewhere, in support of propositions of law sought to be estab-
184. The name alone produces each of the seven cases, but in some instances, of
course, more than one case. The name combined with the docket number singles out four
of the seven cases: People v. Rangel (154 Cal. App. 3d 544, 201 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1984));
People v. Harrison (150 Cal. App. 3d 1142, 198 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1984)); People v. Sweeney
(150 Cal. App. 3d 553, 198 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1984)); and People v. Miles (153 Cal. App. 3d
652, 200 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1984)). A fifth case is People v. Castro itself, for which the toenote
gives not the docket number but the citation to the subsequent opinion of the supreme
court, 38 Cal. 3d 301. A search using the name Castro and this citation (as part of the
subsequent history) produces the court of appeal opinion in Castro (151 Cal. App. 3d 48,
198 Cal. Rptr. 645 (1984)). Lexis is not infallible, and for the two remaining cases, People
v. Aldana and People v. Juarez, the name-plus-docket-number search does not work. But
Aldana can be singled out (151 Cal. App. 3d 948, 199 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1984)) by using the
name and the date of depublication given in the toenote (April 19, 1984), and Juarez (149
Cal. App. 3d 1104,197 Cal. Rptr. 397 (1983)) by using the name and date of transfer by the
supreme court (May 16, 1985), also given in the toenote.
Another method is to use the case names and limit the search by date or subject
matter. A name search limited by the words "prior felony" appearing in the opinion, for
example, retrieves each of the seven cases and for none of them a group of more than six
cases. It is then easy enough to skim the headings, dates, and subsequent histories and pick
the desired case from each group.
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lished. To name in citation. To mention in support, illustration or
proof of.l 8 5
The American Heritage Dictionary requires only a "reference": "Law.
A reference to previous court decisions or authoritative writings."'1 86
More specific is David Mellinkoff's Dictionary of American Legal Us-
age, which gives two definitions for "citation of authority": (1) "writ-
ten or oral presentation of legal and other materials supporting a
lawyer's argument to a court"; and (2) "the formalized legal reference
to an authority and the place where it can be found, as, e.g., a case,
United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988)."187
Mellinkoff's second definition comes closest to supporting the po-
sition that the supreme court was not "citing" the cases when it gave
their names, docket numbers, and dates of depublication. Presumably
two arguments would be made under this definition: that the court's
statement was not a "formalized legal reference," and that it was not a
reference to "the place where [the case] can be found." A legal refer-
ence can be "formalized," however, without giving volume and page
numbers in a case reporter. The identification of the first case in Tur-
ner's toenote-"People v. Rangel (4 Crim. 14993), opinion deleted
upon direction of Supreme Court by order dated June 14, 1984"188-
would seem formalized enough, whether by virtue of the docket
number, the date of depublication, or the overall style.
The second argument perhaps makes a stronger case linguistically
for the proposition that the supreme court was not "citing" the cases.
One could argue that the traditional volume-and-page citation gives a
"place where [the case] can be found," and that a citation to Lexis's
own reporting system would do so as well, but that this test is not met
simply by giving information that makes it easy to find the case in
Lexis, since without a mention of Lexis itself there is no reference to
"the place where [the case] can be found." An equally literal reply
might be that the information in Turner meets the "place" test by vir-
tue of the court of appeal docket number, which gives the court of
appeal docket as a "place where [the case] can be found." Or it might
be said that the test is met by the "Cal. App." designation (in Foot-
note Seventeen's top tier), which identifies the file of California appel-
185. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 244 (6th ed. 1990). Black's definition of "Citation of
authorities," id. at 243, is similar.
186. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 348 (3d ed.
1992).
187. DAVID MELLINKOFF, MELLINKOFF'S DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL USAGE
79 (1992).
188. Turner, 50 Cal. 3d at 704 n.17, 789 P.2d at 906 n.17, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 725 n.17.
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late cases in Lexis or Westlaw as a "place where [the case] can be
found."
But surely such literalism should not be the final word. The pur-
pose of Rule 977(a)'s ban on "citing" unpublished cases is to prevent
those cases from being used as precedents, and to this end to prevent
them from being considered by subsequent courts. These purposes
are defeated, one would think, any time that a court (or a lawyer)
gives the name of a depublished case and sufficient identifying charac-
teristics to find the case readily. This functional approach seems con-
sistent with the first meanings given in each of the three dictionaries-
meanings that require only a "reference" to the legal authorities or a
"presentation" of them. 8 9 As long as it is clear to the lawyers and the
court which cases are being referred to, and as long as those cases can
readily be found, the precise form or manner by which the cases are
identified and found does not seem important. The supreme court's
purpose in having its Reporter supply the information in the Turner
toenote presumably was, precisely, to enable the court's audience to
find the depublished cases that the court had named. The information
thus served the purpose of "citing" those cases-as the court appears
to have acknowledged by hiding behind its Reporter.
The purpose of the rule against "citing" depublished cases in-
termeshes with Rule 977(a)'s other prohibition, against "relying on"
such cases. Cases are not to be cited so that they may not be used as
precedents-that is, relied on. This intermeshing is seen in the dic-
tionary definitions of "cite" that include the notion of use "in support"
of a legal proposition or argument.190
The intermeshing was seen as well in Turner. Whether or not the
court in Turner was "citing" the depublished opinions, it would seem
to have been "relying on" them. It was relying on them not to estab-
lish the present law, but to establish the law as it would have appeared
to a competent trial attorney at the time of Turner's trial.191 As the
court stated, that attorney "could well have surmised" that any objec-
tion to admission of the prior felonies would be futile, because "all but
189. See supra text accompanying notes 185-187. Insofar as the definitions may seem
to require that the cases be not only referred to but also relied on-e.g., referred to "in
support of propositions of law sought to be established," see supra text accompanying note
185-this requirement was met in Turner, the depublished cases were invoked in support
of the court's proposition that "all but one originally published Court of Appeal decision
addressing the issue had so concluded." Turner, 50 Cal. 3d at 703-04, 789 P.2d at 906, 268
Cal. Rptr. at 725.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 185-187.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 72-75.
March 1994] DEPUBLICATION DEFLATING
one originally published Court of Appeal decision addressing the issue
had so concluded. ' 192 In so stating, the court would seem to have
been "relying on" those court of appeal decisions. No reason appears
why reliance on depublished cases to establish how the law would
have appeared in the past, and hence to establish the legal proposition
that a lawyer's conduct was justified, is not reliance on depublished
cases, in violation of Rule 977(a). 193
Turner thus occupies an important place in the history of depubli-
cation. It appears to have been the first case in which the California
Supreme Court "cited" depublished cases.194 Further, the court in
Turner also appears to have violated the other prohibition of Rule
977(a) by "relying on" depublished cases. The undoing of Rule 977(a)
had begun.195
192. 50 Cal. 3d at 703-04, 789 P.2d at 906, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
193. Admittedly, Rule 977(a) was designed to prevent unpublished opinions from in-
fluencing subsequent law. Thus the classic kind of targeted "reliance" would be reliance on
a depublished opinion to determine what the law is for the present and future. The reli-
ance involved in Turner was reliance at one remove: The court was not relying on the
depublished cases directly to establish the law, but rather to justify a lawyer's past reliance
on those cases to establish the law. The reliance thus being justified, however, was the
classic kind of reliance. It was designed to establish, or predict, what the law then was for
the present and future. Thus the Turner court's reliance on the depublished cases to justify
the lawyer's reliance on them does offend, albeit indirectly, the primary purpose of Rule
977(a).
Nor do the equities support a different conclusion. The trial counsel whose reliance
was upheld in Turner could claim no justification for relying on depublished opinions, an
act prohibited by Rule 977(a). See supra text accompanying note 8. Compare Lindeleaf v.
Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 41 Cal. 3d 861, 870,718 P.2d 106, 111,226 Cal. Rptr. 119,
124 (1986); see supra note 68. The court there rejected reliance on a depublished opinion
to establish past law: "once we ordered Christopher depublished, it could not be cited as
authority and Lindeleaf could no longer claim an effective modification of the law." Id.
Lindeleaf was not cited in Turner.
194. But see Lindeleaf, 41 Cal. 3d at 870, 718 P.2d at 111, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 124 (refer-
ring to depublished case by name and docket number, in course of rejecting reliance on it
to establish past law).
195. The courts of appeal, before and after Turner, likewise have flirted with "citing"
depublished cases, but with no consistency. See, e.g., Weiner v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos.,
232 Cal. App. 3d 537, 543 n.4, 284 Cal. Rptr. 340, 343 n.4 (1991), ordered depublished,
California Supreme Court Minutes, Oct. 3, 1991, in CAL. OFFICIAL REP., Nov. 19, 1991, at
9 (name, "Cal. App." designation, docket number, and date of depublication); People v.
Cruz, 165 Cal. App. 3d at 652 (name and date of depublication); People v. McClanahan, 7
Cal. App. 4th at 1719 n.3, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 851 n.3, affd, 3 Cal. 4th 860, 838 P.2d 241, 12
Cal. Rptr. 2d 719 (1992) (court "acutely aware" of cases but does not name them); People
v. Dee, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 763 (name, "Cal. App." designation, docket number, and date
of depublication, with court nonetheless declaring that in view of Rule 977(a), "[w]e there-
fore give no citations to these . . . cases," 222 Cal. App. 3d at 764); In re Marriage of
Padilla, 18 Cal. App. 4th 708, 712 n.4, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 630, 632 n.4, review granted, 862 P.2d
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45
DEPUBLICATION DEFLATING
(4) People v. Saunders and the Contest Between Depublished Opinions
and Depublication Orders
In People v. Saunders,196 Justice Kennard argued in dissent that
the supreme court's depublication of two cases contrary to People v.
Wojahn, while letting Wojahn and a case following it stand, justified
counsel's reliance on Wojahn in failing to object to discharge of the
first jury.197 In making this argument Justice Kennard referred to the
two depublished cases by name, "Cal. App." designation, and docket
number; she also gave the date of depublication.198 While this was the
same information the court had given in Turner, Justice Kennard did it
in her own voice, instead of using the Reporter of Decisions as ventril-
oquist's dummy. (The court itself in Saunders, while arguing that Jus-
tice Kennard was wrong in relying on the depublication orders, did
not cite or name the depublished cases.) 199
While Justice Kennard in Saunders would seem to have "cited"
depublished opinions, she did not also "rely on" them, as the court
had in Turner. She relied, rather, on the depublication orders. To cite
or rely on depublication orders appears not to violate Rule 977(a),
which only bars citing or relying on "[a]n opinion that is not ordered
published. ' '2°° The depublication order, after all, is the antithesis of
the depublished opinion. But relying on a depublication order does
seem to violate Rule 979(e), since it involves treating the depublica-
tion order as an expression of opinion by the supreme-court (concern-
ing the correctness of the depublished opinion).
Thus, Rule 977(a) bars reliance on a depublished opinion, and
Rule 979(e) bars reliance on a depublication order. The supreme
court's idea behind this apparent stand-off may be that the depub-
lished case simply washes out, leaving neither an opinion nor a depub-
lication order to influence the subsequent development of the law.
That result, however, seems unlikely, since the two rules are not bal-
anced. Rule 979(e) is a substantive command to disregard the depub-
lication order. Rule 977(a) is an instrumental, technical mandate that
the depublished opinion not be "cited" or "relied on." Rule 977(a)
662, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 662 (1993) (saying supreme court has "cited" unpublished opinions
and consequently citing them fully, with Cal. App. and Cal. Rptr. citations).
196. 5 Cal. 4th 580,853 P.2d 1093,20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 638 (1990); see supra text accompa-
nying notes 118-152.
197. Id. at 606-09, 853 P.2d at 1108-10, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 653-55 (Kennard, J.,
dissenting).
198. Id. at 607, 853 P.2d at 1109, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 654 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
199. See id. at 592 n.8, 853 P.2d at 1098-99 n.8, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 643-44 n.8.
200. CAL. CT. R. 977(a).
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says nothing about how a court should regard a depublished opinion
after learning about it. Since that opinion is in fact a precedent, courts
may well be inclined to "follow" it. As between the depublication
order and the depublished opinion, in terms of their likely influence
on subsequent decisions, the depublished opinion would seem to have
the upper hand.
There is a paradox, moreover, lurking in the conclusion that to
cite a depublication order does not violate Rule 977(a). That rule in-
deed only prohibits citing (or relying on) depublished opinions, and
the depublication order is the opposite of the depublished opinion. In
a practical sense, however, citing the depublication order may subvert
Rule 977(a), since the depublication order leads directly to the depub-
lished opinion (through the Cal. App. cite given in the order, among
other routes).
Underlying this paradox is a fundamental conflict between reality
and pretense inherent in the system of depublication. On the one
hand, depublished opinions may not be cited; the pretense is that they
do not exist. On the other hand, opinions must get depublished some-
how, and this happens by an order of the supreme court. It would be
impractical and objectionable, for various reasons, to extend the pre-
tense to the supreme court's depublication orders and decree that
these, too, may not be cited. But once the depublication orders re-
main on the record and citable, it becomes harder and harder-given
the new capabilities of legal research-to maintain the fiction that the
objects of those orders, the depublished opinions, do not exist. Citing
the depublication orders becomes more and more the functional
equivalent of citing the depublished opinions. Reality and pretense
do not go easily hand-in-hand.
(5) Cynthia D. v. Superior Court
Rule 977(a) took another blow from the supreme court in
Cynthia D. v. Superior Court,201 decided a month before Saunders in
June 1993. Writing for the court, Justice Edward Panelli, in the course
of rejecting a constitutional challenge to the statutory framework for
terminating parental rights, inserted a footnote stating: "This analysis
is adapted from a concurring opinion by Kline, J., in the Court of Ap-
peal in In re Michaela C * (Cal. App.). '20 2 Sure enough, Michaela C.
201. 5 Cal. 4th 242, 851 P.2d 1307, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 698 (1993).
202. 5 Cal. 4th at 254 n.9; see infra note 204 for a discussion of this footnote as it
appears in the California Reporter and Pacific Reporter.
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had been depublished.20 3 The court's Reporter of Decisions thus was
called in, as in Turner, to attach a toenote at the asterisk, giving
Michaela C.'s docket number and date of depublication.20 4
Asked by a newspaper reporter about this apparent citation of a
depublished opinion, Justice Panelli reportedly said that
he had checked with the reporter of decisions, who told him it
would be all right to cite the concurring opinion. It was the majority
opinion, after all, that the high court didn't like. And, Panelli said,
"I didn't want to plagiarize. '205
Justice Panelli's reported remark raises a number of questions.
Since a depublication order depublishes all the opinions in a case, con-
currences and dissents included, it is not clear what basis there is for
reading into Rule 977(a) an exception allowing the citation of depub-
lished concurring opinions. Nor does the rule appear to have an ex-
ception for citing depublished opinions in order to avoid plagiarism, a
rationale that potentially could cover any use of a prior opinion. Fur-
ther, it is not clear where the Reporter of Decisions gets the authority
203. In re Michaela C., 2 Cal. App. 4th 1229,3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 869 (1992), ordered depub-
lished, California Supreme Court Minutes, Apr. 23, 1992, in CAL. OFFICIAL REP. (advance
sheet), May 26, 1992, at 17-18.
204. The two-tier footnote reads:
9 This analysis is adapted from a concurring opinion by Kline, J., in the Court of
Appeal in In re Michaela C.* (Cal.App.).
* Reporter's Note: Opinion in In re Michaela C. (A048689) deleted upon
direction of Supreme Court by order dated January 21, 1992.
5 Cal. 4th at 254 n.9. (The Reporter has his dates wrong. January 21, 1992 was the date
Michaela C. was decided by the court of appeal. See Michaela C., 2 Cal. App. 4th at 1229,3
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 869. The date of depublication by the supreme court was April 23, 1992.
See California Supreme Court Minutes, Apr. 23, 1992, in CAL. OFFICIAL REP. (advance
sheet), May 26, 1992, at 17-18.)
The versions of this footnote that appear in Cynthia D. as reported in the West Pub-
lishing Company's unofficial reporters suggest that West is no longer willing to ride in the
Mickey Mouse parade of California's depublication system. Neither the California Re-
porter nor the Pacific Reporter retains either the two-level structure of the footnote or the
"Reporter's Note." Compare 5 Cal. 4th at 254 n.9 with 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 705 n.9 and 851
P.2d at 1314 n.9. Both versions ignore the docket number supplied in the "Reporter's
Note" and instead give traditional citations for Michaela C.; the California Reporter gives
the Cal. Rptr. cite, while Pacific Reporter gives both the Cal. Rptr. and the Cal. App. cite
(and drops any notification that the case was depublished). See 19 Cal. Rptr. at 705 n.9;
851 P.2d at 1314 n.9.
205. Scott Graham, But It Was A Really Good Depublished Ruling, THE RECORDER,
July 20, 1993, at 2. The "Reporter's Note" fig leaf worn by the court in the official version
of Cynthia D., 5 Cal. 4th at 254 n.9, was apparently an afterthought. The Recorder's article
quotes the original version of the footnote as reading: "This analysis is adopted from a
concurring opinion by Kline, J., in the court of appeal in In re Michaela C. (Nos. A048689,
A050714, filed Jan. 21, 1992)." Graham, supra.
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to tell a supreme court justice that it is "all right" to violate a Rule of
Court. Finally, if supreme court justices cavalierly disregard a Rule of
Court, one wonders what moral authority they have to hold others to
those rules.206
(6) The Unraveling of Rule 977(a) in the Courts of Appeal
As the supreme court takes increasing liberties with Rule 977(a),
the courts of appeal, as one would expect, are joining in. One court of
206. The Cynthia D. episode illumines another strange aspect of California's nonpubli-
cation rules. Court of appeal opinions are automatically depublished when "superseded"
by a grant of review, see CAL. CT. R. 976(d), and the supreme court often "grants and
holds" cases raising questions that it currently has under review in another case. See CALI-
FORNIA SUPREME COURT PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES 14 (1990); Grodin, supra note 16,
at 519. In deciding one of those questions in the case under review, the court may well find
that some portion of one of the opinions it has put on "grant and hold" is persuasive,
illuminating, or otherwise worth referring to. But Rule 977(a), if obeyed, prohibits the
court from citing or relying on that opinion. Thus, for one thing, the court may not observe
the elemental tenet of intellectual honesty that Justice Panelli wanted to observe in
Cynthia D.-to avoid "plagiariz[ing]" by giving credit where credit was due. (Although
Michaela C. had been affirmatively depublished, it would have been likewise uncitable if it
had been put on "grant and hold" pending disposition of Cynthia D. See CAL. CT. R.
976(d), 977(a).)
Further, the universe of court of appeal precedents that the supreme court may explic-
itly consider is thus artificially truncated, cutting out the most recent cases. The court may,
and often does, cite court of appeal decisions on the issue it is considering that were de-
cided prior to the first case in which it granted review, and that accordingly have not been
put on "grant and hold" and thus depublished. See, e.g., Hill v. National Collegiate Ath-
letic Ass'n, 7 Cal. 4th 1, 18, 865 P.2d 633, 643, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 834, 844 (1994); Howard v.
Babcock, 6 Cal. 4th 409, 417, 863 P.2d 150, 154, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 80, 84 (1993); Massey v.
Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 5 Cal. 4th 674, 679, 854 P.2d 117, 119, 20 Cal. Rptr. 825, 827
(1993). But the court may not, if it honors Rule 977(a), make similar use of court of appeal
opinions decided after that first case and hence put on "grant and hold" pending the
court's decision.
Indeed, the same problem applies to the opinion of the court of appeal in the very
case under review. Since that opinion has been automatically depublished, the court may
not, in faithfulness to Rule 977(a), "cite" or "rely on" it, either. But the court (or an
individual justice) often recites, paraphrases, or relies on the opinion of the court of ap-
peal, and sometimes expressly adopts parts of that opinion as its own. See, e.g., People v.
Superior Court (Lavi), 4 Cal. 4th 1164, 1173-74 n.5, 847 P.2d 1031, 1035 n.5, 17 Cal. Rptr.
2d 815, 819 n.5 (1993), as modified, 5 Cal. 4th 294a (1993) ("[L]ike the Court of Appeal
herein, we decline .... ); People v. Tenner, 6 Cal. 4th 559, 568, 862 P.2d 840, 845, 24 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 840, 845 (1993) (Mosk, J., dissenting) ("I agree with the Court of Appeal in this
case .... "); Municipal Ct. v. Superior Ct. (Gonzalez), 5 Cal. 4th 1126, 1128-29, 857 P.2d
325, 326, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504, 505 (1993) (agreeing with court of appeal opinion and adopt-
ing it as court's own). There is no reason why the court should not be freely able to do
these things, which may both facilitate and improve its work. It is hard to square these
judicial techniques, however, with Rule 977(a). A rule that on its face prohibits the court
from using, acknowledging, and citing such supremely relevant materials, or that allows the
court to do so only by evasion or scofflawism, tends to undermine the moral authority of
the court, besides approaching the absurd.
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appeal has said as much. In In re Marriage of Padilla,20 7 involving
another clash between lines of appellate authority-on whether con-
cealment of the child by the custodial parent affects enforcement of
child support obligations-the supreme court had recently granted re-
view of a case, In re Marriage of Damico,20 8 that followed one of the
lines. Damico thus was automatically rendered "unpublished" by vir-
tue of Rule 976(d), 209 and hence could not be cited or relied on by
virtue of Rule 977(a).210 The court in Padilla noted this prohibition. 21'
It added, however, that "two recent opinions from the California
Supreme Court"-the majority opinion in Cynthia D. and Justice
Kennard's dissent in Saunders-"have cited unpublished opinions for
reasons other than reliance upon them. 212 Thus, the court said,
"[tlhe message from the Supreme Court seems to be that unpublished
opinions may be cited if they are not 'relied on."' 21 3 Accordingly,
"[w]e cite Damico not to rely on it, but to highlight the present split of
authority and to help elucidate our agreement with the ... line of
cases" that Damico followed.
The court proceeded to cite Damico fully, with Cal. App. and
Cal. Rptr. citations, thus dropping all pretense of obeying Rule
977(a)'s ban on citation. 21 4 And despite the Padilla court's claim that
it was not "relying on" Damico, its use of that case seems to fit the
classic meaning of legal "reliance. '215
207. 18 Cal. App. 4th 708, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 630, review granted, 862 P.2d 662, 24 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 662 (1993).
208. 15 Cal. App. 4th 263, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 88, review granted, 856 P.2d 1131, 22 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 275 (1993).
209. "Unless otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court, no opinion superseded by a
grant of review, rehearing, or other action shall be published." CAL. Or. R. 976(d); see
supra note 206.
210. See supra text accompanying note 8.
211. Padilla, 18 Cal. App. 4th at 712 nA, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 632 n.4.
212. Id at 712 nA, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 632 n.4.
213. Id. at 712 nA, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 632 n.4. The court at this point cited Rule
977(a), but said nothing about how the supreme court's "message" might be squared with
that rule.
214. Id. at 712-15, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 632-34. Another court of appeal, perhaps taking
its cue from Cynthia D., see supra text accompanying notes 201-205, has given a Cal. App.
cite for a depublished dissenting opinion, and relied on that opinion as well. In re Monique
S., 21 Cal. App. 4th 677, 682 n.6, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863, 866 n.6 (1993) (agreeing with and
citing dissent in In re Joshua G., 14 Cal. App. 4th 242, 250-53, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 522, 526-29
(1993), ordered depublished, California Supreme Court Minutes, July 1,1993, in CAL. OFm-
CIAL REP., Aug. 19, 1993, at 2).
215. The court quoted from the Damico opinion three times, once by way of stating a
precedent, 18 Cal. App. 4th at 714, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 633, and twice in support of argu-
ments the Padilla court was making (e.g., "[W]e agree with the Damico court that .... ").
Id. at 715, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 634. The Padilla court concluded: "We therefore agree with
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Meanwhile another court of appeal, in Dakin v. Department of
Forestry & Fire Protection,216 appears to have relied on a depublished
case without citing or even naming it-a technique well geared to
camouflage any violation of Rule 977(a).217 This was reliance to es-
tablish past law, as in Turner, but again no reason appears why that is
not "reliance" for the purpose of Rule 977(a).
Thus, as the ban on "citing" depublished opinions more and more
is ignored, and the weight of the depublication policy shifts to the rule
against "relying on" those opinions, what it means to "rely on" a case
becomes as slippery and debatable as what it means to "cite" one.
The ban on "reliance," too, seems headed for the legal attic.
The supreme court has granted review of Marriage of Padilla, ap-
parently to hold it pending decision of Marriage of Damico.21 8 The
Padilla court's declaration that unpublished opinions "may be cited if
the reasoning of [three prior cases] and Damico .... Id. at 717, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635.
Unless one can "rely" only on an assertedly binding precedent-and California court of
appeal decisions never are binding for other California courts of appeal, see supra note 164
and accompanying text-the Padilla court's use of Damico seems the classic way that a
court "relies on" a precedent to support its legal arguments and conclusion.
216. 17 Cal. App. 4th 681, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 490 (1993).
217. The court ruled that a statutory 90-day deadline for requesting a hearing was ap-
plicable to writ petitions challenging the state's approval of timber harvesting plans. But
"[s]everal years ago ... we filed an opinion ruling the statute inapplicable," the court said,
and that opinion "was the only law on the subject and was no doubt relied on by parties to
timber harvest cases." Id. at 687-88, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 493. "Although that opinion was
ultimately depublished by the Supreme Court," under Rule 979(e) the depublication order
"cannot be 'deemed an expression of opinion of the Supreme Court .... ' the court contin-
ued. Id. at 688, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 493. Thus, the "interests of fairness" required that the
Dakin decision operate only prospectively and not bar the challenge before the court. Id.
at 688, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 494.
The court in Dakin did not "cite" the depublished opinion, or even name it. It appears
to have "relied on" that opinion, however, to establish that failure to take certain action
was justified under the law prevailing at the time, much as the supreme court did in Turner.
See supra text accompanying notes 72-76. The court's statement that the opinion was "ulti-
mately" depublished suggests that this case was different from Turner-that the opinion
was not yet depublished when "parties to timber harvest cases" relied on it. The key ques-
tion, however, would seem to be whether the opinion had been depublished when this
plaintiff relied on it. The court hides that information, stating vaguely that the unnamed
depublished opinion was issued "[s]everal years ago." A quick look in Lexis indicates that
the case was Sierra Club v. Department of Forestry, 225 Cal. App. 3d 537, 275 Cal. Rptr.
243 (1990), decided (as modified) November 26, 1990, and depublished February 14, 1991.
See 1991 Cal. LEXIS 638. The plaintiff in Dakin filed his petition on November 18, 1991
(17 Cal. App. 4th at 684, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 491), which thus appears to have been nine
months after depublication of the case he supposedly relied on. The Dakin court might
have been more candid, especially since it was doing no more than the supreme court had
done in Turner.
218. See Summary of Cases Accepted by Supreme Court, Week of Nov. 15, 1993, in
CAL. OFFICIAL REP. (advance sheet), Dec. 14, 1993, at 2.
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they are not 'relied on' thus itself is now depublished. Courts will be
aware of that declaration, however, and may hail its courage and can-
dor. With the supreme court effectively citing depublished opinions, it
is only fair that lower courts-not to mention lawyers-be allowed to
do the same. With the supreme court disdaining to obey a Rule of
Court, it is refreshing that a lower court has the courage to say so.
C. The Status of Rule 977(a)
After reviewing the judicial developments from Turner in 1990219
to Saunders,' 0 Cynthia D.,221 and Padilla-2 in 1993, one can only con-
clude that Rule 977(a)'s ban on "citing" or "relying on" depublished
opinions has been substantially undermined. This fact has conse-
quences not only for depublication, but also for the work of Califor-
nia's lower-court judges, judicial research attorneys, and practicing
attorneys. It also implicates the moral authority of the California
Supreme Court and the judicial system generally.
As far as the rule against "citing" depublished opinions is con-
cerned, the supreme court (or one of its members) in three cases has
referred to depublished opinions by name, docket number, and date
of depublication. 223 If "citing" a case means naming the case and giv-
ing sufficient identifying indicia to find it readily, then the supreme
court has been citing depublished cases, in derogation of Rule 977(a).
That the court recognizes this is suggested by the way it relies on its
Reporter of Decisions to supply the illicit information. The court of
appeal in Padilla was calling a spade a spade-or a cite a cite-when it
took from the supreme court's recent opinions the message that "un-
published opinions may be cited .... "224
This situation presents a hard dilemma for lawyers. While judges
can violate a Rule of Court with impunity, the same is not true of
lawyers. They face a real threat of sanctions, or the risk of antagoniz-
ing a judge, if they do something that constitutes "citing" a depub-
219. 50 Cal. 3d 668,789 P.2d 887,268 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1990); see supra text accompany-
ing notes 45-82, 184-195.
220. 5 Cal. 4th 580, 853 P.2d 1093,20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 638 (1993); see supra text accompa-
nying notes 196-200.
221. 5 Cal. 4th 242, 851 P.2d 1307, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 698 (1993); see supra text accompa-
nying notes 201-206.
222. 18 Cal. App. 4th 708,22 Cal. Rptr. 630, review granted, 862 P.2d 662,24 Cal. Rptr.
2d 662 (1993); see supra text accompanying notes 207-218.
223. Turner, 50 Cal. 3d at 704 n.17, 789 P.2d at 906 n.17, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 725 n.17;
Saunders, 5 Cal. 4th at 607, 853 P.2d at 1109, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 654 (Kennard, J., dissent-
ing); Cynthia D., 5 Cal. 4th at 254 n.9, 851 P.2d at 1314, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 705.
224. Padilla, 18 Cal. App. 4th at 712 n.4, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 632 n.4.
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lished case in violation of Rule 977(a). A lawyer should have a
defense based on doing exactly what the California Supreme Court
has been doing, but it may not be either realistic or fair to expect a
lawyer to take the chance.
The question of "citing" depublished cases shades into the ques-
tion of "relying on" them, inasmuch as a lawyer's primary purpose in
citing a case is to have some persuasive impact. Once cases are being
cited, the rule against reliance becomes crucial. And the meaning of
"reliance," no less than the meaning of "citation," becomes problem-
atic. For example, is there an exception for relying on depublished
cases to establish past rather than present law? That is what the
supreme court did in Turner,225 but it is not clear what basis there is
for such an exception. The uncertain meaning of "reliance" puts a
high premium on contrivances and evasions. So we have the Padilla
court's straight-faced claim: "We cite Damico not to rely on it, but to
highlight the present split of authority and to help elucidate our agree-
ment with the ... line of cases" that Damico followed. 226 And we
have the Dakin court's reliance on a case without citing or naming
it. 2 27
The rule against "reliance" is where the lawyer's dilemma really
bites. The concept of "reliance" is more vague and various than that
of "citation," so the lawyer has less chance to take refuge in doing
exactly what the supreme court has done. Yet the lawyer may reason-
ably think that his client's interest, even his client's life, requires viola-
tion of Rule 977(a). Turner, for example, was a death penalty appeal
in which appellate counsel could get the court to reach the merits of
the Castro issue only by persuading the court either that trial counsel
was incompetent-not an attractive argument-or that trial counsel
was justified in relying on depublished opinions.228 Turner's appellate
counsel says he in fact worried about violating the rule and courting
sanctions and for that reason "danced around the issue," not naming
or citing the depublished cases but referring to them indirectly. 229 Yet
it would seem that he was, nonetheless, relying on them.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 184-195.
226. Padilla, 18 Cal. App. 4th at 712 n.4, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 632 n.4; see supra text
accompanying notes 184-195.
227. Dakin, 17 Cal. App. 4th at 687-88,21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 493-94; see supra text accom-
panying notes 207-218.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 49-52.
229. Letter from Dennis A. Fischer, Esq. to Stephen R. Barnett (Jan. 14, 1994) (on file
with the Hastings Law Journal); Telephone Interview with Dennis A. Fischer (Feb. 11,
1994); see supra note 52 and accompanying text.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45
There is something wrong here. There is something wrong in the
first place when the California Supreme Court, and lower'courts fol-
lowing its lead, scoff at a Rule of Court. The problem extends beyond
disrespect for law, and takes on elements of injustice and hypocrisy,
when the rule applies equally to courts and lawyers but does not treat
them equally. Judges can violate the rule with impunity. Lawyers are
put to the hard choice of risking personal sanctions-not to speak of
betraying a possible respect for the law-and failing to make an argu-
ment that might help their client.
The growing subversion of Rule 977(a) poses a problem that will
continue to expand, it seems, as long as depubication continues. The
heart of the difficulty lies in the inherent contradiction between the
existence of depublished opinions and the supreme court's attempt to
make those opinions invisible to courts deciding subsequent cases.
Depublished opinions are precedents in fact; they are important
enough to have been published in the first place; they have figured in
judicial action by the state's highest court; and they are readily found
by modem methods of legal research. These salient attributes defy
any attempt to suppress these opinions, whether by bans on "citing"
them or on "relying on" them or by any other device. The court is
doomed to fail in its effort to make history disappear.
D. The Surviving Impact of Depublication in Light of the Decline of
Rule 977(a)
It remains to reconsider the surviving impact of depublication in
light of the decline of Rule 977(a). We had noted that, with depubli-
cation orders no longer functioning as quasi-precedents in their own
right, depublication has only the "negative" effect of eliminating the
depublished opinion as a published (or "official") precedent.23 That
effect has some impact in shaping the law, but the impact is reduced
now that courts of appeal-and trial courts not bound by opposing
precedents-are free to replicate depublished opinions. We then
asked whether depublication also had an impact in shaping the law by
making it less likely that the depublished opinion would come to the
attention of, and be persuasively argued to, a subsequent court.231
The purpose of Rule 977(a)'s mandate that a depublished case "shall
not be cited or relied on," after all, presumably was precisely to keep
the opinion from influencing a subsequent court. Now that courts
may replicate depublished opinions, it is all the more important
230. See supra text accompanying notes 153-157.
231. See supra text accompanying note 168.
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whether they find out about those opinions and be subjected to argu-
ments based on them.
Given the shrunken observance of Rule 977(a), it does not ap-
pear that depublication has any appreciable effect in preventing the
depublished opinion from coming to the notice of a subsequent court.
Depublished opinions are regularly researched by appellate lawyers,
and these lawyers have ways of referring to depublished cases even
without naming them (witness the brief in Turner).232 Moreover, the
supreme court and courts of appeal now are citing depublished cases,
or at least referring to them by name, docket number, and date of
depublication. This not only shows that those courts are aware of the
cases, but suggests that lawyers need not fear sanctions for referring to
depublished cases in the same way.
It may be less clear that a depublished case will have a full oppor-
tunity to influence the court, given Rule 977(a)'s ban against "relying
on" depublished opinions. It is one thing for the court to know about
a previous decision; it may be another thing for arguments based on
that decision, perhaps creative or subtle arguments, to be pressed on
the court by persuasive advocacy. Thus there may be some need for
judges and their staffs to take the initiative in researching depublished
cases and developing from them arguments that ordinarily could be
left to the lawyers to make.233 In most cases, however, competent
judges and judicial researchers will see readily enough the implica-
tions a previous opinion may have for the case under review. And
where there is an ingenious argument to be made, one would think
that the lawyer clever enough to make it would also be clever enough
to get it into the brief, and to do so in some way that avoids flaunting
disrespect for Rule 977(a).
Thus, in light of the erosion of the rule against citing or relying on
depublished opinions, any remaining effect of depublication in
preventing the depublished opinion from coming to the attention of
the court, or from influencing the court, would appear to be minimal.
Conclusion
The traditional understanding of depublication, which viewed a
depublication order as a rejection of the court of appeal opinion and a
sort of precedent in its own right-a "signal" sending "guidance" to
232. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
233. Cf. Elder v. Holloway, 114 S. Ct. 1019, 1021 (1994) (holding that appellate review
of qualified immunity dispositions must be conducted in light of all relevant precedents,
not simply those cited to or discovered by district court).
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the lower courts-no longer is tenable. Rule 979(e) cancels that un-
derstanding by declaring that a depublication order "shall not be
deemed an expression of opinion of the Supreme Court." Saunders
confirms that the rule means what it says, and the court has put teeth
into the rule by three times vindicating opinions it had depublished
over opposing ones it had left standing.
The result is that depublished opinions no longer bear a scarlet
"D." Courts of appeal, and trial courts not bound by a published ap-
pellate opinion going the other way, have the supreme court's blessing
to replicate both the result and the reasoning of a depublished opin-
ion, as long as they do so without "citing" or "relying on" that
opinion.
Depublication thus retains only the "negative" effect of eliminat-
ing the court of appeal opinion as a published precedent. This effect
has two possible components. First, since the depublished opinion no
longer has the cachet of being an "official" precedent, courts are less
likely to "follow" it than they would have been if it had remained
published. The difference between published and depublished opin-
ions in this respect, however, has been reduced. Depublished opin-
ions are de facto precedents. When there is no published appellate
opinion going the other way, the affinity that courts have for prece-
dents may well incline them to exercise the license they now have to
replicate the depublished opinion. Even when there is a published
appellate opinion opposed to the depublished one, courts are likely
now to consider the opposing opinions on their merits, with little if
any deference for the published one. In sum, depublished opinions
have been upgraded from "discredited" precedents to "de facto"
precedents; the distance between them and published opinions, or "of-
ficial" precedents, has been narrowed.
The other component of depublication's "negative" effect would
prevent the depublished opinion from coming to the attention of a
subsequent court, and from influencing that court, by the command of
Rule 977(a) that such opinions not be "cited" or "relied on." But that
command is faltering. The California Supreme Court has been refer-
ring to depublished opinions by name, docket number, and date of
depublication-action that looks, walks, and quacks like "citing"
those opinions. The court also seems to have "relied on" depublished
opinions, as courts of appeal seem to have been doing as well. The
increasing nonchalance about Rule 977(a), combined with improved
methods of legal research, means that there is now little chance-if
there ever was-that a relevant depublished opinion will escape a
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court's attention. The surviving effect of depublication therefore is
limited to somewhat lessening the likelihood that the opinion will be
"followed" by another court.
Since Rule 977(a) by its terms applies equally to courts and liti-
gants (that is, lawyers), the California Supreme Court's disrespect for
the rule creates a problem of moral authority. If the supreme court
does not obey one of its own Rules of Court, the question arises
whether it can expect others to do so-or can credibly impose any
law. The court's conduct produces, among other consequences, a hard
dilemma for lawyers. They must choose between risking personal
sanctions for "citing" or "relying on" a depublished case and failing to
make an argument that might help their client. The problem grows
because the concept of "relying on" a case, no less than the concept of
"citing" one, is increasingly fuzzy and subject to evasion.
If the California Supreme Court's machine for making law with-
out deciding cases-its practice of depublication-appears to be
breaking down, key reasons lie in two problems at the heart of depub-
lication. One is the conflict between the conspicuous realities of
depublished opinions-their status as precedents in fact; their impor-
tance; their original (and continued) publication; their involvement in
judicial action by the supreme court; their easy accessibility in com-
puterized data bases-and depublication's pretense that these opin-
ions are invisible to other courts. The other problem lies in the
difficulty of maintaining a fixed meaning for a practice that consists of
an unexplained legal act by a seven-member court. As the supreme
court began to agree with cases it had depublished, depublication be-
gan to lose its meaning, a process consummated by the adoption of
Rule 979(e) and the decision in Saunders. The arbitrary and unarticu-
lated nature of depublication led, fittingly enough, to the official ex-
pungement of any meaning from the court's act.
Drained of meaning and increasingly hard-pressed to hold back
reality, depublication faces a clouded future. This bleak prospect rein-
forces Professor Kelso's judgment, made on other grounds and shared
by other observers, that depublication is "a practice that should be
stopped. ' 234 Perhaps it is time for the California Supreme Court to
heed this counsel.
234. Kelso, supra note 1, at 496.
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